Examining the reform of the land acquisition system and the entry of collective construction land into the market
Published:
2010-07-31
Abstract:Based on the analysis of the problems existing in the current land expropriation system in China, this paper analyzes the shortcomings of the current land expropriation system from multiple angles and finds out the solutions and measures to solve the problem fundamentally. On this basis, the revised draft of the Land Management Law is reviewed, hoping to attract the attention of scholars to the revision of the Land Management Law.
Key words:Land Expropriation Collective Construction Land Entering the Market "Land Management Law" Revised Draft
1. Introduction
The issue of land expropriation is one of the current social hotspots. For a long time, due to the system is not perfect, the government's concept of the rule of law is not strong, the function of dislocation and other factors, China's land expropriation system has many defects. Especially since the beginning of the new century, the pace of urbanization has accelerated, which has led to large-scale land expropriation disputes. Land expropriators and land expropriated farmers have continued to engage in a tense interest game, causing many social problems. Land disputes arising from agricultural land expropriation have emerged one after another. Relevant statistics in 2006 show that my country's urban construction and industrial construction expropriate nearly 200000 hectares of land every year, and the contradiction caused by land expropriation has become the most prominent problem in our society at this stage. The rural mass incidents caused by land expropriation every year It accounts for more than 65% of the country's rural mass incidents.[1]And these numbers are increasing every year.
The call for the reform of the land acquisition system has been uninterrupted, and the attention of all sectors of society to this issue has reached an unprecedented height. Whether the development of industrialization and urbanization must be at the cost of sacrificing the vital interests of farmers? What is the direction of the reform of the land expropriation system? These are all problems that need to be solved urgently before us. If these problems are not solved well, it will inevitably affect the process of China's urbanization, economic development and even social stability and unity, and affect the construction of a harmonious socialist society. To do a good job in this area, we must find the root of the problem., Fundamentally reform our current land acquisition system.
2. Analysis of China's Current Land Expropriation System
(I) the Problems of the Current Land Expropriation System in China
There are many problems exposed in the implementation of the current land expropriation system, and some behaviors have seriously violated the basic principles and legislative intentions of land expropriation. The main problems of infringement of farmers' rights and interests by illegal land expropriation are:
First, the abuse of land acquisition power, the scope of expropriation is too wide. The most criticized part of China's current land expropriation system is that the exercise of land expropriation rights is not entirely out of the public interest. Due to the unclear definition of the public interest of land expropriation in legislation, some local government agencies arbitrarily interpret "public interest" and arbitrarily include commercial land and business land into the category of public interest, resulting in frequent and large-scale land acquisition, which infringes on the rights and interests of farmers.
In addition, since the implementation of the system of paid use of land in China, many local governments have been happy to exercise the right of land acquisition in order to increase fiscal revenue, often providing preferential policies to investment units through the establishment of development zones and science and technology parks, and land use fees are often one of their preferential conditions. Although the current Land Management Law stipulates that the power of examination and approval of land expropriation shall be exercised by the State Council and the people's governments at the provincial level, local governments at all levels still have certain powers, coupled with the imperfect supervision mechanism, resulting in some fraudulent acts in the process of land expropriation declaration.[2]
Second, the compensation for land acquisition is unreasonable. For farmers, government agencies have bought out the land on which their ancestors have depended for their survival for generations with very low compensation fees. The loss of land means the loss of the basis for survival. The land compensation fees and labor resettlement subsidies stipulated in my country's "Land Management Law" are calculated based on the average annual output value of the three years before the expropriation of the land. The basis for the calculation of the compensation standard is the annual output value of agricultural land, which is very unscientific. Moreover, according to the relevant provisions of Article 47 of the land management law, "the sum of land compensation fees and resettlement subsidies shall not exceed 30 times of the average annual output value of the three years before the land is expropriated", "other land compensation fees and resettlement fees shall be levied by provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government with reference to the standard provisions of land compensation fees and resettlement fees for the expropriation of cultivated land", The larger free floating range and "reference" reference "gives the government great freedom of discretion. Because the government shares the benefits of land expropriation as a stakeholder, and the expropriated party rarely participates in the expropriation process, many local governments often compensate in accordance with the statutory minimum standards and even fail to meet the statutory minimum standards. Within the authority of free adjudication, it is even more common to have unreasonable phenomena that are obviously unfair. In practice, the government often obtains the land at the consideration of paying a lower compensation fee, and then transfers it to the market with a very high land use right transfer fee, and the resulting value-added is huge. But landless collective organizations and farmers cannot profit from value-added. The statutory compensation for land expropriation is far from enough to solve the long-term livelihood of land-expropriated farmers.
Third, when the compensation fee is already very small, and most of the collective economic organizations are not standardized, the land compensation fee is often controlled by a small number of people in the collective economic organizations. In the end, there are very few in the hands of farmers, and the compensation is not in place. And some farmers will be more unfamiliar with the compensation into other industries, once the failure also lost the basis of life.
(II) Causes and Countermeasures of the Problems in China's Current Land Expropriation System
First, on the abuse of "public interest" land acquisition power.
As for the problem of the generalization of public interests in China's current land expropriation system, many scholars in China have tried to find relevant solutions through research. The articles they have studied can be said to be numerous. Most of them clearly define public interests, make them detailed, have operability, and avoid the generalization of public interests. Commercial and operational land expropriation in the name of public interests, scholars have devoted a great deal of effort to the term "public interest.
However, the author thinks that these measures can not fundamentally solve the problems existing in the current land expropriation system. The reason is very simple. The legal system is a tool for interest adjustment. Behind the law is the distribution and game of interests. Behind the system is a certain interest distribution system. Any legal problem must ultimately be attributed to the central point of interest.
First of all, local governments include commercial land and operating land into the scope of land acquisition in the name of public interest. It is not just a simple issue of public interest definition. Local government officials cannot know what public interest is. The key to the problem is that the government has the interest drive to do so. This is the local government's dependence on land finance. According to statistics, Beijing's fiscal revenue in 2009 was 200 billion, among them, the land transfer fee income is 92.8 billion, accounting for 46.4 of the total fiscal revenue. In 2009, Jinan's land transfer fee income was 13.8 billion yuan, which is estimated to account for nearly 50% of Jinan's total fiscal revenue.[3]. It can be seen that the government has participated in the interest chain of land expropriation, and is the biggest beneficiary in this chain, and its interests are consistent with the interests of the commercial developers of the land, and both have the interest impulse of expropriating rural collective land at a low price. In other words, in the behavior of commercial land expropriation, the government stands on the opposite side of the land expropriated farmers, and in the behavior of commercial land expropriation, the government is actually playing the role of a commercial rational person who buys and sells land.
Second, the urgent need for land for industrialization and urbanization. With the continuous acceleration of urbanization, urban land can no longer meet the needs of urban development, which forces cities to ask for land from rural areas, and the current land policy basically blocks the way out for commercial development on collective land,[4]To carry out commercial development on collective land, the only way is to transform rural collective land into state-owned land. At present, the only way to transform is government expropriation, but the only reason for local governments to expropriate land is public interest.
Therefore, simply by defining public interests, it is impossible to prevent the problem of land acquisition and commercial development in the name of public interests. After all, the society is developing rapidly and urbanization is accelerating. The finiteness of urban land determines that the development of cities will inevitably expand to the countryside, and they must ask for land from the countryside. Moreover, local governments also have the interest impulse of land acquisition. Under this joint force of need and benefit, it is inevitable when collective land is expropriated for commercial development in the name of public interest. Therefore, the fundamental way to solve this problem is to allow the rural collective construction land to be directly used for commercial and operational development, to separate the local government's dependence on land finance, to transform the government's functions, to turn the government's land acquisition-the transfer fee earned into the government's normal tax revenue, to design a reasonable system and mechanism, to separate the government from the interest chain of land acquisition, so that the interests in the middle can be detached, in order to better exercise the function of public management and the role of the adjudicator.
The only way to separate the government's interest chain in land acquisition is to allow collective construction land to enter the city, establish a unified urban and rural land transaction market, and make state-owned land and rural collective construction land have the same land rights. It is meaningful to return farmers to their dominant position and leave an outlet for the commercial development of collective land, so that strict government land acquisition is strictly limited within the scope of public interests.
In fact, the reform of the land acquisition system does not mean that local governments cannot obtain the benefits in the process of land conversion from agricultural land to non-agricultural land. First of all, the value added of land use conversion in the process of urbanization mainly comes from urban infrastructure and industrial development, rather than land farmers' investment in land. Therefore, the collection of a certain proportion of land value-added tax is not only reasonable, but also can realize the transformation from non-standard extra-budgetary land transfer to budgetary tax, improve the management of local finance, and realize the transformation of government functions. Secondly, accelerate the reform of the fiscal and taxation system, and gradually introduce property tax:
(1) Amend the "Interim Regulations on Land Value-Added Tax" to extend the scope of application to collective land, design a reasonable tax rate, and expand the government's tax sources on the transfer, transfer and lease income of rural land use rights. The tax object includes not only the transfer and lease income of collective non-construction land for non-public welfare projects after strictly limiting the scope of land acquisition, but also the income from the transfer of collective construction land.
(2) On the basis of the pilot comprehensive property tax. The research work on the reform of property tax has been officially launched since 2003. The State Administration of Taxation and the Ministry of Finance have successively approved six provinces and cities, including Beijing, Jiangsu and Shenzhen, as pilot units to carry out pilot real estate simulation tax assessment. In 2007, the State Administration of Taxation and the Ministry of Finance added Henan, Anhui, Fujian and Dalian as part of the real estate simulation tax assessment to expand the scope of the pilot. At present, these ten cities are in the stage of simulated idling, but many cities have submitted application plans for property tax "idling" to the State Administration of Taxation and the Ministry of Finance.[5]If we can levy property tax on a pilot basis, it will be a stable and lasting tax source for local governments.
If we want to strictly limit the scope of public welfare land acquisition and comprehensively carry out the market-oriented reform of rural collective construction land, we need to promote the land value-added tax and property tax at the same time. According to the calculations of relevant scholars, land value-added tax and property tax revenue can completely make up for the government's loss in land transfer fees, and can effectively restrain the impulse of local governments to attract investment through large-scale land acquisition and low land price strategies, so as to effectively protect The interests of farmers, improve the efficiency of land use, reduce the pressure of cultivated land protection, and ultimately help to achieve the overall development of urban and rural areas. In fact, the Third Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues in Promoting Rural Reform and Development" made special provisions on the use of rural collective land: "Outside the scope of urban construction land determined by land use planning, Approved occupation of rural collective land to build non-public welfare projects, allowing farmers to participate in development and operation through various methods in accordance with the law and protecting their legitimate rights and interests. Gradually establish a unified urban and rural construction land market. For rural collective operating construction land obtained in accordance with the law, land use rights must be transferred through a unified tangible land market and in an open and standardized manner, and enjoy equal rights and interests with state-owned land under the premise of conforming to the plan."
Second, on land acquisition compensation standards and procedures.
We have to go back to the source, what is land acquisition? Why does the government want to land? Land acquisition based on what? In fact, land expropriation is a strict restriction on the original land owner's right to dispose of the land and the right to profit. It is a restriction and deprivation of property rights. It must have a legal reason, because when the government exercises the right to land acquisition, the status of both parties in land acquisition It is not equal, and the expropriation behavior is compulsory and there is no choice.
In a market economy country, the allocation of resources through the market should be the first choice of policy. In fact, many products, factors of production and natural resources in our society are indeed allocated through market mechanisms. But land is an important exception. For example, the government wants to build an open public green space. This project is obviously for the public interest of the surrounding environment and residents. If the land required for this project belongs to many different owners, and the government hopes to purchase these through purchase. land. The predictable result is that the government must pay a very high price to achieve its goals. This is because every owner wants to get the relevant value-added benefits from this project, so he is not willing to sell the land to the government at a low price. The price that the government has to pay is even likely to exceed the budget of the project, and since the project is funded by government taxes, this operation will increase the burden on taxpayers.[6]
It is for this reason that preventing individual landowners from delaying public projects that require large amounts of land constitutes the raison d'être of land acquisition rights. Because if the government must reach an agreement with each landowner in a public project, high transaction costs may prevent the project from being implemented, as each landowner has an incentive to hold the land in order to benefit from the value added by the public project. The use of land acquisition rights can effectively solve the "retention" problem, and reduce transaction costs to ensure the smooth implementation of public projects.
Therefore, it can be considered that land expropriation is a means to solve the problem of market failure through government intervention. However, through the above analysis, we can also draw such a conclusion that land acquisition is only a matter of restricting the free disposition of land owners, and it is a question of restricting whether to sell or not to sell and to whom. However, the right of the owner to obtain fair and reasonable compensation (I. e. compensation according to market value) cannot be restricted. Based on this, Article 10 of China's Constitution stipulates: "The state may expropriate or expropriate land in accordance with the law for the sake of public interest. And give compensation." Because, from an economic point of view, the expropriation of land is to provide public goods for the people in a certain region. The beneficiaries of public goods are the people in a certain region, and the cost should be borne by all the beneficiaries rather than an individual.
The cost of "public interest" should be borne fairly by all beneficiaries. If fair and reasonable compensation is not given to the expropriated, it is in the name of "public interest" that some people bear the cost of the public interest of all the people. In particular, these people who bear the cost of public interest are the vulnerable groups of the whole people. This is very unfair. Moreover, historical experience has more than once told us how serious the consequences of violating personal interests under the banner of public interest will be.
Then it is to improve the compensation procedure, establish the dominant position of the expropriated farmers and introduce a fair negotiation mechanism on the basis of the evaluation price of the expropriated land and its attachments by the third-party evaluation agency.In the current land expropriation system, farmers lack the dominant position, as the most direct interest of land expropriation, lack the right to speak, only as an object of expropriation, not the subject of expropriation. Looking at the entire land acquisition system, as the farmers of the land-expropriated party, they have almost no right to make decisions. They have never been treated as a subject, let alone opportunities for negotiation and dialogue, because land acquisition is mandatory and compensation standards are also determined. Moreover, there is no administrative or judicial channel that can effectively relieve the government's land acquisition behavior. That is to say, in the whole process of land acquisition, farmers are in a passive position, and they can only expect the government's compensation similar to alms. We cannot expect the government to take the initiative to give the expropriated person full and fair compensation, only the introduction of a third-party assessment agency, and give the expropriated person the right to negotiate on an equal footing with the government (I. e., the expropriation), after all, the essence of expropriation is to limit the right of disposition, not the price of disposition.
To solve the problem of the virtual position of the subject of collective land ownership, and to clarify the income subject of collective land.Article 10 of the Land Administration Law stipulates: "if the land owned by the rural collective belongs to the village farmers' collective according to law, it shall be managed and managed by the village collective economic organization or the villagers' committee; if it has been owned by the farmers collectively belonging to two or more rural collective economic organizations in the village, it shall be managed and managed by the rural collective economic organizations or villagers' groups in the village; if it has been owned by the township (town) rural collective, operated and managed by township (town) collective economic organizations." However, the current legislative model does not make a strict definition of "collective", the ownership of the main multi-level and uncertainty of the provisions, but resulting in the collective land ownership of the main body of the virtual position, resulting in the collective land owned by everyone, but everyone has no right. The unclear subject of income mainly stems from the unclear definition of rural land ownership in our country's legislation. Article 5, paragraph 3, of the "Village Committee Organization Law" stipulates: "The village committee shall, in accordance with the law, manage the land and other property collectively owned by the village farmers in the village, educate the villagers to use natural resources rationally, and protect and improve the ecological environment." For a long time, as a rural grassroots autonomous organization, the village committee has been regarded as a representative of the collective economic organization. The village committee has the right to decide the use of the income of the village collective economy, the fund-raising plan of the village public welfare undertakings, the establishment of the village collective economic projects, the construction contracting plan of the village public welfare undertakings, the contracted management plan of the villagers, the use plan of the homestead and other major issues related to the personal interests of farmers, however, due to the unclear property rights of collective land ownership, individual farmers do not have strong rights to oppose the various rights of collective economic organizations exercised on behalf of village committees. In this way, collective ownership actually becomes the ownership of a few village cadres. Only by solving the problem of the virtual position of collective land ownership and clarifying the main body of income can we better improve the compensation procedure, because the best way to prevent power corruption is transparency and restriction. Especially stakeholder constraints.[7]
The revision of the law should be based on the pros and cons in past practice, correct the mistakes in the original law, make the law more fair, and make the society more effective. However, the revised draft of the Land Management Law recently submitted to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council can be said to run counter to it, which is called "a rare draft law revision in the world" by scholar Sheng Hong ".
Comments on the Relevant Articles of the 3. Land Management Law
(I) on the Scope of Land Acquisition and the Entry of Collective Construction Land into the Market
New Article 68 of the revised draft stipulates on the scope of land expropriation: "For the needs of the public interest, the following constructions require the use of collectively-owned land, which shall be expropriated as State-owned in accordance with the law: (1) Within the scope of urban construction land, the State implements urban planning for construction; it is (II) to carry out the construction of public welfare projects such as infrastructure, public management and service facilities, and military facilities outside the scope of urban construction land determined by the overall land use plan. The catalogue of land for public welfare projects shall be formulated separately. Outside the scope of urban construction land determined by the overall land use plan, if land needs to be expropriated for the construction of non-public welfare projects for the public interest, the procedures shall be approved by the State Council or the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government."
This is the so-called "inside \outside the circle" that is commonly mentioned in the academic circles. According to the draft, countries in the urban planning circle can expropriate collective land according to the needs of urban construction without distinguishing whether it is for the public interest. Article 13 of the Constitution and Article 42 of the Property Law clearly stipulate that government expropriation must be for the public interest. Does the use of planning to limit land acquisition achieve the goal of strictly defining public welfare land acquisition and narrowing the scope of land acquisition? The answer is no. The purpose of planning is to effectively plan space resources, improve the effective utilization of land, and promote the rational use and development of land. In theory, there is no necessary connection between planning and land expropriation, and the planning system in our country is not perfect. In practice, the phenomenon of arbitrary planning and modification of planning is very common. Therefore, it is not feasible to restrict land acquisition by planning.[8]
Moreover, the implementation of urban planning by the State does not justify land acquisition. There is no doubt that the implementation of urban planning by the government can, but does not necessarily, safeguard the public interest. Urban planning can prevent the improper use of land through zoning control, land use and intensity control, and planning and construction of urban roads. However, in a certain sense, urban planning is a kind of "expropriation" of land and property rights to a certain extent ". In other words, the implementation of urban planning itself has already expropriated urban land in this sense, and it is implemented through land use and use intensity control, rather than deprivation of land ownership. And this through urban planning to limit the use of land expropriation in the vast majority of cases without compensation. Since urban planning can be achieved through the regulation of land use and intensity of use, as well as the expropriation of the right to development of specific land, why should the Government care whether the controlled land is State-owned, collective or even private?
Even outside the planning circle, the construction of non-public welfare projects for the public interest requires land acquisition, but since it is a public interest need, how can it be a non-public welfare project? It also leaves a gap for non-public welfare land acquisition, and perhaps the revised draft is really hard to say, because in the draft, the mouth for the transfer of rural collective construction land is not fully liberalized. If the collective land can be transferred, then the acquisition of land can be reduced to the public interest, the purpose is more simple. If collective land cannot be transferred, and there is no way to build non-public welfare projects in rural areas without land acquisition, then land acquisition must be a pot of stew, all-encompassing. It can be said that land expropriation and the circulation of collective construction land into the market are in fact two sides of the same coin, and there is a relationship between one and the other. Allowing collective construction land to enter the market means that this part of land will no longer be nationalized through expropriation. Therefore, the extent to which the reform of the land acquisition system is advanced determines the scope of collective construction land entering the market, and even determines the fate of collective land other than construction land. The draft just blocked the way out of the circulation of collective construction land into the primary market.
Although the draft adds Article 94, "Local people's governments at or above the county level shall establish a unified urban and rural land market." "The transfer, transfer and lease of the right to the use of state-owned construction land and the right to the use of collective construction land must be carried out in an open manner through a unified land market." "The transfer of land contractual management rights should be incorporated into the unified urban and rural land market." Specific institutional arrangements have been made for the principle of "market allocation of land", emphasizing the "unification of urban and rural areas" of the system, and recognizing that the right to the use of collective construction land can be traded on the same basis as the right to the use of state-owned construction land.
However, judging from the text of the entire "revised draft", the addition of these three clauses is relatively passive, more like a declarative clause added in the context of the general trend of reform and the "decision" of the Third Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
Looking at the "revised draft", the principles established in these three articles have been weakened, disintegrated and emptied in each specific article. For example, Article 68 expands the definition of public interest, includes more rural collective land in the scope of government expropriation, and gives the land pricing power and dispute adjudication power to the land expropriation party (Article 69 and Article 71). Since pricing is determined by government departments, land use is restricted by government departments, land transactions are monopolized by government departments, and disputes over land transactions are decided by government departments, the basic elements of the market system, market pricing, competition and property rights, have been emasculated, and "market-oriented allocation" is only a dead letter.[9]
Looking at the entire "revised draft", it is difficult for us to find "collective construction purposes" that can enter the market ". There is no positive definition of "collective construction land. Through the deletion of the "exception clause" in Article 43 of the current "Land Management Law", and the addition of Article 88 "The right to use rural collective construction land within the scope of urban construction land determined by the overall land use plan shall not be transferred unless due to enterprise bankruptcy, merger, etc, by adding the exception of Article 93" except for the use of this collective construction land for the construction of township (town) village public facilities, public welfare undertakings and rural villagers' residential land ", and by adding Article 95" the exclusion of state-owned construction land should be used for the construction of commercial housing ", the so-called" collective construction land "that can enter the market is not found at all, or there is very little left. Even so, transactions related to the right to the use of collective construction land must be "reported to the land administrative department of the people's government at the county level for approval" (new Article 97). We know that transactions that require government approval are not normal market transactions unless they involve monopoly and national security.
Therefore, in order to truly implement "marketization of land allocation", "protection of land rights" and "unified land market in urban and rural areas", it is necessary to delete and modify these provisions that actually weaken, disintegrate and empty the three basic institutional principles.
(II) on compensation standards and procedures for land acquisition
First, the reason why the draft gives the government the right to expropriate or expropriate rural collective land is for the "public interest". Under the banner of this public interest, the draft can limit compensation for land acquisition to much lower than the market value of land for agricultural use. Although the draft deletes this obviously unfair clause, it still puts the compensation standard in the hands of the government. Instead of compensation based on market value. The so-called "fair compensation" is the compensation according to the market value, that is, if the original landowner sells the land to obtain the market income. This means that the draft considers that the interests of some people can be infringed or sacrificed for the public interest.
Second, although the draft provides more detailed provisions on expropriation compensation procedures and living security and resettlement measures for land-lost farmers (Articles 70, 71, 72, 73, 74), however, looking at these provisions, it still treats land-lost farmers as land-expropriated farmers, as managers, rather than as subjects, and these provisions are not very operational. Secondly, Article 71 still follows the practice of government departments being both athletes and referees, using government rulings as the final solution to land acquisition compensation disputes, depriving land-expropriated farmers of their litigation rights, and the ruling period does not affect the land acquisition. The normal implementation of land acquisition puts the land-expropriated farmers who are already in a weak position in a more passive position, and there is no room for maneuver, make "protecting the rights and interests of land owners" an empty phrase.
It is hard to imagine that a law on such a major issue related to the rise and fall of our society should be revised to such an extent. It is no wonder that Mr. Sheng Hong expressed such feelings. However, such a revised draft that violates common sense has been submitted to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council. Since the above analysis shows that the "revised draft" of the land management law is so obvious or even blatant, We have reason to believe that this is definitely not a technical problem, it is a matter of legislative procedure. From the beginning of the drafting of the revised draft, many experts have expressed doubts about such a way of working behind closed doors within relevant interest departments. We hope that the legislature will not use the "revised draft" of the Land Management Law drafted by the Ministry of Land and Resources as the basis for deliberation on the revision of the law.
[1]Wang Hongru: "Land acquisition of nearly 200000 hectares per year-land disputes urgently urge the reform of the land acquisition system", China Economic Weekly, No. 9, 2006.
[2]Mo Yuchuan: "Some Issues on Land Expropriation and Requisition in China",http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp？id = 33684
[3]Yang Shilin: "Dialysis of the Phenomenon of Demolition and Self-Immolation-Taking Chengdu Resident Tang Fuzhen Demolition and Self-Immolation as an Example", 2010 Jinan City "Resolve Contradictions and Disputes, Maintain Social Stability" Theoretical Seminar Essay.
[4]Enterprises that conform to the overall land use plan and obtain construction land in accordance with the law, except for the transfer of land use rights in accordance with the law due to bankruptcy, merger and other circumstances.
[5]http://www.huanqiu.com/zhuanti/finance/wuyeshui/
[6]Wang Hui and Tao Ran: "How to Achieve a Systematic Breakthrough in the Reform of the Land Expropriation System<土地管理法>Proposals to amend the draft http://www.china-review.com/lat.asp?id=22628
[7]Problems and Countermeasures in Rural Land Expropriation, http://cj.zhue.com.cn/xingyedianping/200901/21-57539.html
[8]A Brief Discussion on Land Expropriation Reform in Revision of Land Management Law, http://www.mlr.gov.cn/tdsc/lltt/201004/t20100402_143808.htm
[9]Sheng Hong: 《<土地管理法>and its "revised draft" critique, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=164560
(This article won the second prize of 2010 Jinan excellent lawyer paper)
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