Viewpoint | Practical Analysis of the New Measures for the Administration of Corporate Bond Issuance and Trading
Published:
2021-12-09
为贯彻落实《证券法》和《国务院办公厅关于贯彻实施修订后的证券法有关工作的通知》,规范公司债券的发行、交易或转让行为,保护投资者的合法权益和社会公共利益,加强事前事中事后监管,2021年证监会修订发布《公司债券发行与交易管理办法》(第180号令,2020年8月7日发布征求意见稿)。该文件根据《证券法》的要求(如落实公司债券的注册制、将证券服务机构从事证券服务业务由行政许可调整为备案管理),并结合“取消强制评级要求、严禁结构化发债等自融行为、规范承销机构的承销业务行为,严禁发行人、控股股东、实控人和董监高的逃废债行为、调整普通投资者参与公募公司债券的条件、加强债券持有人权益保护”等新变化,对证监会113号令进行修订。本文拟以上述新变化为切入点并结合本律师已承办的数十支公司债券交易纠纷案件经验,对《公司债券发行与交易管理办法》修订版(以下简称《管理办法》)中的实务难点进行梳理并解析,一窥未来公司债券市场归位尽责的新秩序。 一、弱化外部评级依赖:取消强制评级要求 债券市场出现危机以来,降低外部评级依赖已是市场共识。针对我国信用评级行业存在评级虚高、区分度不强等“重市场份额、轻评级质量”的问题,降低对外部信用评级依赖亦成为政策层面需要考量的因素。其中,2020年11月中旬相继发生的河南永煤、华晨汽车、清华紫光以及河北冀中等多家AAA级国企违约事件亦强化了这一导向。 《管理办法》删除了原第十九条关于公开发行公司债券应当委托资信评级机构进行信用评级的条款内容,同时还删除了普通投资者参与公募公司债券的评级要求(以往普通投资者只能认购AAA级公募公司债券),实际上确立了交易所市场公开发行公司债券将全面取消强制评级的新秩序。 取消强制评级要求有以下好处,首先,可以促进资信评级市场实现有序竞争和良性循环,改变评级机构一味抢市场而忽视评级质量,以级定价、以价定级、评级虚高、评级结果经不起市场检验,评级调整滞后等问题,有助于恢复行业公信力;其次,弱化投资人对外部评级的依赖,增强市场导向也符合国际趋势,将有望促进评级回归揭示风险、市场合理风险定价的本源。 但取消强制评级要求也会带来相应的挑战。从监管层面而言,不排除发行人自身信用良莠不齐导致审核机构的审核压力增加而出现挂一漏万的情形。从投资者角度分析,《管理办法》实施后投资者将会面临外部评级结果缺失的可能性,由此也会导致投资者追偿发行人的诉讼/仲裁案件中丧失可以证明发行人存在违约行为及偿债能力不足的有利证据,这对投资者而言并不十分有利,需要搜集或组织其他证据链予以弥补缺失。无论政策执行效果如何,笔者都建议投资者(尤其机构投资者)从现在开始建立一套弱化外部评级依赖的内部信评标准或咨询专业的律师团队进行风险评估。 二、加强监管力度:严禁结构化发债等自融行为 结构化发债是在去杠杆和强监管的背景下,在部分市场主体通过债券市场融资较为困难的情况下出现的一种诡异现象,其本质是发行人、承销机构等为提高债券发行成功率而自行或通过其他方式认购自身发行的债券。结果上看,结构化发债等自融行为使得债券的票面利率难以真实反映市场定价情况,破坏了融资的“直接”属性及市场秩序,且在后续的债券违约追责过程中,发行人可利用“两张脸”所扮演的不同角色,促使持有人会议陷入困局,造成严重的不良后果。 为此,《管理办法》第四十五规定:“发行人和承销机构不得操纵发行定价、暗箱操作;不得以代持、信托等方式谋取不正当利益或向其他相关利益主体输送利益;不得直接或通过其利益相关方向参与认购的投资者提供财务资助;发行人不得在发行环节直接或间接认购其发行的公司债券。发行人的董事、监事、高级管理人员、持股比例超过百分之五的股东及其他关联方认购或交易、转让其发行的公司债券的,应当披露相关情况”。 笔者认为,上述规定在制度上虽明确了打击结构化发债的态度,但实际执行过程中能否做到,除了靠发行人等主体的自律外,更依赖债券受托管理人在债券存续期内重点监控。持有人可扮演“黄雀”的角色,盯紧债券受托管理人,重点可以从受托管理人是否已勤勉尽责地履行管理人义务和管理人是否已及时履行披露义务与处理利益冲突等方面来进行证据搜集,以压实机构责任的方式来维护自身合法权益,具体可以侵权之诉、违约之诉或证券虚假陈述之诉来进行追责(需根据实际案情及相关证据来具体判断)。但上述追责不同于公司债券违约纠纷中债券持有人直接起诉发行人的债券违约兑付本息责任案件,而是属于由实际出资人向资产管理人、受托管理人等主体主张过错赔偿责任案件,这在资本市场纠纷中鲜有成功案例,究其原因还是因为相关证据收集及因果关系认定方面存在困难,而债券持有人受限于知识、经验和手段等各方面的因素影响,很难发现受托管理人的违规行为,仅依靠持有人自有能力维权,难度较大。 三、归位尽责:规范承销机构的承销业务行为 承销机构为冲击债券市场业绩,做大承销规模,低价投标是近年的常态,该现象严重扰乱了承销市场秩序。为此,《管理办法》重点从两个方面做出了规定: 1.要求建立内部问责机制,规范过度激励与低价竞争等不规范承销行为; 2.要求主承销商承担更高的尽调和复核责任,并按照合理性、必要性和重要性原则,对公司债券发行文件的真实性、准确性和完整性进行审慎核查,并确认发行文件披露的信息不存在虚假记载、误导性陈述或者重大遗漏。 事实上,2020年12月4日,交易商协会便已经发布《非金融企业债务融资工具主承销商尽职调查指引》,与《管理办法》的规定相辅相成。笔者认为,承销机构若可以归位尽责,投资者便可多一份保障,对投资者最长情的告白便是承销商真诚的陪伴。当然,持有人若没有这份陪伴甚至还可能被承销机构伤害,也不用怨天尤人。 近年来,债券违约处置已成为司法部门和监管部门的关注重点,且关注点已不仅局限于发行人,实际已转移至承销商等中介机构。2020年12月31日,杭州市中级人民法院对“五洋债”欺诈发行案作出一审判决,要求债券承销商等中介机构向债券投资者承担连带赔偿责任。由此,不仅醍醐灌顶给承销商等机构好好的上了一课,更为投资者指明了另一条维权之路—向债券承销商等证券服务机构来进行追责。因在证券发行过程中,多数承销商即是该证券的受托管理人,二者存在身份竞合的情形,由此,关于承销商的追责问题,上文已提及,于此不再赘述。只提示一点,持有人如发生相关损失,也可以重点关注会计师事务所、资信评级机构、律师事务所的尽职履责情形,根据《证券法》及《虚假陈述若干规定》中的规定,会计师事务所、资信评级机构、律师事务所都有可能成为欺诈发行、虚假陈述的责任主体,投资者可以通过民事行为、行政手段,甚至通过刑事责任追究等方式来维权。 四、零容忍:严禁发行人、控股股东、实控人和董监高的逃废债行为 2020年11月中旬,河南永煤控股债券违约引发的信用债风暴,注定会成为中国债券违约历史上的一个标志事件,其会逐渐拉开国企债券违约常态化的序幕,亦有望推动国内违约和破产清偿制度的完善。由此,该事件的后续处理,将关乎信用债市场的信用根基。2020年11月21日,中国政府网公告:国务院副总理、国务院金融稳定发展委员会主任刘鹤主持召开金融委第四十三次会议,研究规范债券市场发展、维护债券市场稳定工作。重点提到:秉持态度,维护市场公平和秩序。要依法严肃查处欺诈发行、虚假信息披露、恶意转移资产、挪用发行资金等各类违法违规行为,严厉处罚各种“逃废债”行为,保护投资人合法权益。 还有其他内容,笔者不再一一转述,传达出来的意思很明显,虽是凭本事借出来的钱,但也不能靠厚脸皮赖账,更不能出歪招逃废债。这次要重点整治几家企业,如对华晨集团的立案调查,就是对恶意逃废债的一次正面回击,不是破产就可以逃之夭夭的。关于此,笔者所在团队感触颇深,团队已代理的多支债券案件中,实际已将发行人的主要资产进行了保全(部分案件为全额首封),并通过精细化的庭审准备,获得了胜诉裁决/判决,本可全额拿回应得的财产,但何曾想,发行人总是翻箱倒柜拿出“破产”这道令牌,使得团队多数的努力付之东流。 由此,整治逃废债行为已是迫在眉睫,《管理办法》主要是从“内部人员”法定义务的强化方面来进行治理,如发行人及其控股股东、实际控制人等责任主体存在《管理办法》中所禁止的行为或违反规定的,持有人便不仅可以对发行人进行追责,更可撕破“面纱”,直接追究责任人员的连带侵权责任,要求其赔偿损失。强化措施主要体现在: 1.发行人及其控股股东、实际控制人应当诚实守信,发行人的董监事、高级管理人员应当勤勉尽责,维护债券持有人享有的法定权利和债券募集说明书约定的权利;不得怠于履行偿债义务或者通过财产转移、关联交易等方式逃废债务,蓄意损害债券持有人权益; 2.发行人的董事和高管应当对公司债券发行文件和定期报告签署书面确认意见; 3.监事会应当对公司债券发行文件和定期报告进行审核并提出书面审核意见,监事应当签署书面确认意见。 4.发行人及其控股股东、实际控制人等违反本办法规定,损害债券持有人权益的,中国证监会可以对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员采取责令改正、监管谈话、出具警示函、责令公开说明、责令定期报告、警告、罚款等相关监管措施,依法应予行政处罚的,依照规定处罚;涉嫌犯罪的,依法移送司法机关,追究其刑事责任; 5.发行人及其控股股东、实际控制人、董监事、高级管理人员有逃废债行为的,中国证监会可以依法限制其市场融资等活动,并将其有关信息纳入证券期货市场诚信档案数据库; 6.发行人的控股股东滥用公司法人独立地位和股东有限责任,损害债券持有人利益的,应当依法对公司债务承担连带责任。 上述治理手段能否有效,有待观瞻,最后说一下什么叫“逃废债”? 逃废债属于民事违约行为,不是所有的欠债不还都是逃废债,它主要强调债务人的主观故意。确切的说,有履行能力而不尽力履行债务的行为就是逃废债。从债务人主观上来看,逃废债有两种表现形式:一种是积极的逃避履行债务,我们通常称之为“恶意逃废债”;另一种是消极的不履行。经笔者所在团队已办理的案件分析,逃废债通常有以下手段: 1.恶意隐匿、转移、无偿或不合理低价转让资产; 2.为逃避债务出逃境外; 3.以虚假破产方式金蝉脱壳; 4.以改制、重组、分立、解散等方式剥离有价值资产; 5.通过关联交易抽逃出资、转移利润、转移资产; 6.通过“换牌子”经营来金蝉脱壳; 7.以虚假租赁阻碍执行; 8.以虚假诉讼阻碍拍卖或参与分配; 9.未经债权人同意,擅自处置、毁损抵押资产; 10.恶意为他人提供担保,影响其自身偿债能力; 11.拒不申报财产或虚假申报; 12.借被吊销营业执照之机逃债。 逃废债手段不止上述12种,但破解方法往往可以通用,具体如何破解,且听下回分解。 五、老生常谈:债券持有人权益保护 笔者对前述《管理办法》中的新变化均持肯定态度,但对于《管理办法》中债券持有人权益保护部分,明显感觉力度不够,甚至有“换汤不换药”之感。先说下新变化,主要体现在两个方面: 1.《管理办法》根据财产状况、金融资产状况、投资知识和经验、专业能力等因素,将公司债券投资者分为普通投资者和专业投资者,落实了《证券法》的相关规定,进行适当性的区分有利于更好的解决日后投资者与证券公司产生纠纷后的举证责任分配问题,具有重要意义; 2.调整了普通投资者可参与认购交易公募债券的要求。新《管理办法》在原《管理办法》基础上,增加了向普通投资者公开发行债券的两项条件—“发行人最近一期末净资产规模不少于250亿元”和“发行人最近36个月内累计公开发行债券不少于3期,发行规模不少于100亿元”,删除了原“债券信用评级达到AAA级”的要求。该变化
In order to implement the Securities Law and the Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the Implementation of the Revised Securities Law, regulate the issuance, trading or transfer of corporate bonds, protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors and the public interest, and strengthen supervision before and after the event, the CSRC revised and issued the measures for the Administration of Corporate Bond issuance and Trading in 2021 (order No. 180, Draft for comments issued on August 7, 2020). The document is in accordance with the requirements of the Securities Law (e. g., the implementation of the registration system for corporate bonds, the adjustment of the securities service business of securities service agencies from administrative licensing to filing management), and in conjunction with the "abolition of mandatory rating requirements, the prohibition of self-financing practices such as structured bond issuance, and the regulation of the underwriting business practices of underwriting agencies, new changes such as the prohibition of debt evasion by issuers, controlling shareholders, actual controllers and directors and supervisors, the adjustment of the conditions for ordinary investors to participate in public offering of corporate bonds, and the strengthening of the protection of the rights and interests of bondholders" are strictly prohibited, and Order No. 113 of the CSRC is amended. This article intends to take the above-mentioned new changes as the starting point and combine the experience of dozens of corporate bond transaction dispute cases that the lawyer has undertaken, and the practical difficulties in the revised version of the "Corporate Bond Issuance and Transaction Management Measures" (hereinafter referred to as the "Management Measures") To sort out and analyze, and get a glimpse of the new order of the future corporate bond market to return to its position and fulfill its responsibilities.
1. Weakening External Rating Dependence: Eliminating Mandatory Rating Requirements
Since the crisis in the bond market, it has been a consensus to reduce the dependence on external ratings. In view of the problems of "emphasizing market share and neglecting rating quality" in China's credit rating industry, such as inflated rating and weak differentiation, reducing dependence on external credit rating has also become a factor to be considered at the policy level. Among them, in mid-November 2020, the subsequent occurrence of Henan Yongmei, Brilliance Auto, Tsinghua Ziguang and Hebei Jizhong and other AAA-rated state-owned enterprises default events also strengthened this guidance.
The "Administrative Measures" deleted the content of the original Article 19 that the public issuance of corporate bonds should be entrusted to credit rating agencies for credit rating, and also deleted the rating requirements for ordinary investors to participate in public corporate bonds (in the past, ordinary investors could only subscribe to AAA-rated public corporate bonds), which actually established a new order in which the public issuance of corporate bonds in the exchange market will completely cancel the mandatory rating.
The abolition of the mandatory rating requirement has the following advantages. First, it can promote orderly competition and a virtuous circle in the credit rating market, change the problems of rating agencies blindly grabbing the market and ignoring the rating quality, pricing by grade, rating by price, false high rating, rating results that cannot withstand market inspection, and lagging rating adjustment, which will help restore the credibility of the industry. Secondly, weakening investors' dependence on external ratings and enhancing market orientation are also in line with international trends, it is expected to promote the return of ratings to reveal the origin of risk and reasonable risk pricing in the market.
However, removing the mandatory rating requirement will also bring corresponding challenges. From the regulatory level, it is not ruled out that the issuer's own credit is uneven, resulting in increased audit pressure on the audit institutions and the emergence of a situation of hanging a leak. From the perspective of investors, after the implementation of the administrative measures, investors will face the possibility of lack of external rating results, which will also lead to the loss of favorable evidence in litigation/arbitration cases in which investors recover the issuer's default behavior and insufficient solvency, which is not very beneficial to investors, It is necessary to collect or organize other evidence chains to make up for the lack. Regardless of the effectiveness of policy implementation, the author recommends that investors (especially institutional investors) from now on establish a set of internal credit rating standards that weaken the reliance on external ratings or consult a professional team of lawyers for risk assessment.
2. to strengthen supervision: no structured debt issuance and other self-financing behavior.
Structured bond issuance is a strange phenomenon in the context of deleveraging and strong regulation, when it is more difficult for some market entities to raise funds through the bond market, and its essence is that issuers and underwriters subscribe for bonds issued by themselves or through other means in order to improve the success rate of bond issuance. As a result, self-financing behaviors such as structured bond issuance make it difficult for the coupon rate of bonds to truly reflect the market pricing situation, which destroys the "direct" attribute of financing and market order, and in the subsequent bond default accountability process, the issuer can use The different roles played by the "two faces" have pushed the holders' meeting into a dilemma, causing serious adverse consequences.
For this reason, the 45th Administrative Measures stipulates: "Issuers and underwriting institutions shall not manipulate issuance pricing or black-box operations; shall not seek illegitimate benefits or convey benefits to other relevant stakeholders by means of holding, trust, etc.; shall not directly or Through its stakeholders, investors participating in the subscription provide financial assistance; the issuer shall not directly or indirectly subscribe for the corporate bonds issued by it during the issuance process. If the directors, supervisors, senior managers, shareholders holding more than 5% shares and other related parties of the issuer subscribe for or trade or transfer the corporate bonds issued by them, the relevant information shall be disclosed".
The author believes that although the above provisions in the system to combat the attitude of structured bond issuance, but the actual implementation process can be achieved, in addition to relying on the issuer and other subjects of self-discipline, but also rely on the bond trustee in the bond period to focus on monitoring. The holder can play the role of "yellowbird" and keep an eye on the bond trustee. The focus can be on whether the trustee has diligently fulfilled the obligations of the manager and whether the manager has fulfilled the obligation of disclosure in a timely manner and dealt with conflicts of interest. Collect evidence to protect their legitimate rights and interests by compacting the responsibilities of the institution, specifically, tort claims, breach of contract claims or securities misrepresentation claims can be pursued (subject to specific judgments based on the actual facts of the case and relevant evidence). However, the above-mentioned accountability is different from the case where the bondholder directly sues the issuer for the payment of principal and interest in the corporate bond default dispute, but belongs to the case where the actual investor claims the fault compensation liability to the asset manager, the trustee and other subjects. There are few successful cases in capital market disputes. The reason is that there are difficulties in collecting relevant evidence and determining causality, however, bondholders are limited by various factors such as knowledge, experience, and means. It is difficult to find the trustee's violations. It is more difficult to rely on the holder's own ability to protect rights.
3. due diligence: regulating the underwriting business conduct of underwriting institutions
Underwriters in order to impact the performance of the bond market, large underwriting scale, low-cost bidding is the norm in recent years, the phenomenon seriously disrupted the underwriting market order. To this end, the "Management Measures" focus on two aspects:
1. Requiring the establishment of internal accountability mechanisms to regulate irregular underwriting practices such as excessive incentives and low-price competition;
2. Require the lead underwriter to assume higher due diligence and review responsibilities, and conduct prudent verification of the authenticity, accuracy and completeness of the corporate bond issuance documents in accordance with the principles of reasonableness, necessity and importance, and confirm that the issuance documents disclose There are no false records, misleading statements or material omissions in the information.
In fact, on December 4, 2020, the Association of Dealers has already issued the "Due Diligence Guidelines for Lead Underwriters of Non-Financial Corporate Debt Financing Instruments", which complements the provisions of the Administrative Measures. The author believes that if the underwriting institution can return to its position and fulfill its responsibilities, investors can have more protection, and the longest confession to investors is the sincere company of the underwriter. Of course, the holder may even be hurt by the underwriting agency without this company, and there is no need to complain.
In recent years, the disposal of bond defaults has become the focus of the judiciary and regulators, and the focus has not only been limited to issuers, but has actually shifted to intermediaries such as underwriters. On December 31, 2020, the Hangzhou Intermediate People's Court made a first-instance judgment on the fraudulent issuance of "Five Foreign Bonds", requiring bond underwriters and other intermediaries to bear joint and several liability to bond investors. As a result, it not only taught underwriters and other institutions a good lesson, but also pointed out another way for investors to defend their rights-to hold bond underwriters and other securities service institutions accountable. Because in the process of issuing securities, most of the underwriters are the trustees of the securities, there is a situation of competing identities between the two, thus, the issue of the underwriters' accountability has been mentioned above and will not be repeated here. It is only a reminder that if the holder has related losses, he can also focus on the due diligence of accounting firms, credit rating agencies, and law firms. According to the provisions of the Securities Law and the Provisions on False Statements, accounting Firms, credit rating agencies, and law firms may become the main body responsible for fraudulent issuance and false statements. Investors can use civil actions and administrative means, even through criminal accountability and other ways to protect their rights.
4. Zero Tolerance: Issuers, controlling shareholders, actual controllers and directors and supervisors are strictly prohibited from evading debts.
In mid-November 2020, the credit debt storm triggered by the bond default of Henan Yongmei Holdings is destined to become a landmark event in the history of China's bond default, which will gradually open the prelude to the normalization of bond defaults of state-owned enterprises, and is also expected to promote the improvement of the domestic default and bankruptcy settlement system. Thus, the subsequent handling of the incident will be related to the credit foundation of the credit bond market. On November 21, 2020, the Chinese government website announced that Liu He, Vice Premier of the State Council and Director of the Financial Stability and Development Committee of the State Council, presided over the 43rd meeting of the Financial Commission to study and regulate the development of the bond market and maintain the stability of the bond market. Focus on: Uphold attitude, maintain market fairness and order. It is necessary to seriously investigate and deal with various violations of laws and regulations such as fraudulent issuance, false information disclosure, malicious transfer of assets, and misappropriation of issuance funds in accordance with the law, severely punish various "debt evasion" behaviors, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors.
There are other contents that the author will not repeat one by one. The meaning conveyed is very obvious. Although it is the money borrowed by ability, it cannot rely on the cheek to default, let alone evade debts. This time, we will focus on rectifying several enterprises. For example, the investigation of Brilliance Group is a positive response to malicious evasion of debts. It is not possible to escape from bankruptcy. Regarding this, the author's team felt deeply. In many bond cases that the team has represented, the issuer's main assets have actually been preserved (some cases are the first in full), and through meticulous court preparation, the winning verdict/judgment has been obtained, which could have fully recovered the property due to it. However, have you ever thought that the issuer always rummaged through boxes and put out the token of "bankruptcy", making most of the team's efforts come to naught.
Therefore, it is urgent to rectify the evasion of debts. The "Management Measures" mainly focus on the strengthening of the legal obligations of "internal personnel". For example, if the issuer and its controlling shareholders, actual controllers and other responsible subjects have behaviors or violations of the regulations prohibited in the "Management Measures", the holder can not only hold the issuer accountable, but also tear the "veil" and directly investigate the joint and several tort liability of the responsible personnel, it is required to compensate for the losses. Strengthening measures are mainly reflected in:
1. The issuer and its controlling shareholders and actual controllers shall be honest and trustworthy, and the directors, supervisors and senior managers of the issuer shall be diligent and responsible to safeguard the legal rights enjoyed by bondholders and the rights stipulated in the bond prospectus; they shall not neglect to fulfill their debt repayment obligations or evade debts through property transfer, related party transactions, etc., and deliberately damage the rights and interests of bondholders;
2. The directors and executives of the issuer shall sign a written confirmation of the company's bond issuance documents and periodic reports;
3. The board of supervisors shall examine the documents and periodic reports on the issuance of corporate bonds and put forward written examination opinions, and the supervisors shall sign the written confirmation opinions.
4. If the issuer and its controlling shareholders, actual controllers, etc. violate the provisions of these Measures and damage the rights and interests of bondholders, the China Securities Regulatory Commission may order the directly responsible person in charge and other directly responsible persons to make corrections, supervise conversations, and issue warnings. Letters, order public explanations, order periodic reports, warnings, fines and other relevant regulatory measures, if administrative penalties are required according to law, penalties shall be imposed in accordance with regulations; suspected crimes, to be transferred to judicial organs in accordance with the law and to be investigated for criminal responsibility;
5. If the issuer and its controlling shareholders, actual controllers, directors and supervisors, and senior managers have evaded debts, the China Securities Regulatory Commission may restrict its market financing and other activities in accordance with the law, and include its relevant information in the securities and futures market integrity file database;
6. If the controlling shareholder of the issuer abuses the independent status of the company as a legal person and the limited liability of shareholders to the detriment of the interests of bondholders, it shall be jointly and severally liable for the debts of the company in accordance with the law.
Whether the above-mentioned governance measures can be effective remains to be seen. Finally, what is "debt evasion"?
Debt evasion is a civil breach of contract, not all debts are not paid off, it mainly emphasizes the subjective intention of the debtor. To be precise, the ability to perform without doing its best to meet the debt is debt evasion. From the debtor's subjective point of view, there are two forms of debt evasion: one is active evasion of debt performance, which we usually call "malicious debt evasion"; the other is negative non-performance. According to the analysis of the cases handled by the author's team, there are usually the following means of evading debts:
1. Malicious concealment, transfer, free or unreasonably low transfer of assets;
2. Fleeing abroad to avoid debt;
3. To escape from the shell by means of false bankruptcy;
4. To divest valuable assets by means of restructuring, reorganization, separation, dissolution, etc;
5. The withdrawal of capital contributions, the transfer of profits and the transfer of assets through related transactions;
6. Through the "brand change" business to get out of the shell;
7. obstructing execution with false tenancy;
8. Hindering the auction or participating in the distribution with false litigation;
9. Disposing or destroying the mortgaged assets without the consent of the creditor;
10. Malicious provision of guarantees to others, affecting their own solvency;
11. Refusal to declare property or false declaration;
12. Evading debts by taking advantage of the revocation of business license.
There are more than the above 12 means of debt evasion, but the cracking methods can often be universal, specifically how to crack, and listen to the next decomposition.
5. cliché: protection of bondholders' rights and interests
The author holds a positive attitude towards the new changes in the aforementioned "Management Measures", but for the protection of the rights and interests of bondholders in the "Management Measures", it is obvious that the strength is not enough, and there is even a sense of "changing the soup without changing the medicine. First of all, the new changes are mainly reflected in two aspects:
1. The "Administrative Measures" divides corporate bond investors into ordinary investors and professional investors based on factors such as property status, financial asset status, investment knowledge and experience, professional ability, etc., and implements the relevant provisions of the Securities Law. The distinction of appropriateness is conducive to better solving the problem of the allocation of the burden of proof after disputes between investors and securities companies in the future, which is of great significance;
2. Adjusted the requirement that ordinary investors may participate in the subscription and trading of public bonds. On the basis of the original "Administrative Measures", the new "Administrative Measures" added two conditions for the public issuance of bonds to ordinary investors-"the issuer's net assets at the end of the most recent period shall not be less than 25 billion yuan" and "the issuer has the last 36 months. The cumulative public issuance of bonds shall not be less than 3 issues, and the issuance scale shall not be less than 10 billion yuan", and the original requirement of "bond credit rating shall reach AAA" has been deleted. The change is to achieve substantial protection for ordinary investors by further ensuring the issuer's debt solvency to reduce the risk to ordinary investors.
It is undeniable that the above-mentioned new changes can protect investors to a certain extent, but the "Management Measures", which has the greatest protection for investors, has not changed much and is not satisfactory. Why do you say that? Because the "Management Measures" does not address the core issue of whether the resolution of the holders' meeting can bind the issuer. At present, all the laws, regulations and departmental rules on bondholders' meetings only stipulate that "the resolutions formed by the holders' meeting are binding on all bondholders" and do not mention whether the issuer can be restrained. In judicial practice, this will lead to the holders of defaulting bonds who originally had expectations of the holders' meeting may be half-hearted, because they will find that it is not enough to pass the resolution of the holders' meeting, whether the resolution of the meeting of the holders is binding on the issuer depends on the mood of the issuer, and if the issuer does not agree with or does not take a position on the resolution, the holder, on its own or through the trustee, requires the issuer to perform the resolution without a legal basis and basis.
As a result, it is still a cliche that if the core problem of the holders' meeting cannot be solved, chicken ribs will still be difficult to become delicious. Of course, in order to solve this problem, it is not only necessary to continue to formulate and amend relevant laws, regulations and rules, and to supplement the legal basis for the resolution of the holders' meeting to restrain the issuer, but also to solve the bond underwriter as the convener and host of the holders' meeting. Or the motivation of the trustee to claim rights on behalf of the bondholders, which will not be repeated here.
6. epilogue
Although the "Administrative Measures" are departmental regulations, they are of great significance to the securities field. They reiterate the basic rules of the game in the financial market, that is, "buyers are responsible and sellers are responsible". For bondholders, there are gratifying things. There are also worrying points. The author suggests that bondholders should be able to comprehensively study and judge the relevant investment behavior according to the new order of the bond market's return to due diligence, combined with their own situation, so as to avoid excessive self-responsibility and unbearable burden.
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