Viewpoint | Article-by-article interpretation of Judicial Interpretation No. 13 [2025] on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Criminal Cases of Concealing or Disguising Criminal Proceeds and Criminal Proceeds Income

Article 1 The "criminal proceeds" stipulated in Article 312 of the Criminal Law refer to the illicit money, goods, or other property benefits obtained through crime; "criminal proceeds income" refers to the income derived from criminal proceeds. Accrued interest and other property benefits.

The "other methods" stipulated in Article 312 of the Criminal Law include any means sufficient to conceal or hide criminal proceeds and their income, such as intermediary introduction for buying and selling, receipt, possession, use, processing, providing financial accounts, converting property into cash, financial bills, securities, transferring funds through remittance or other payment settlement methods, cross-border asset transfers, etc.

The first half of Article 1 in the New Interpretation clarifies the concepts of "criminal proceeds" and "criminal proceeds income." Article 312 of the Criminal Law itself does not define these two terms. The 2015 judicial interpretation explained them in its final article: money, goods, and other property directly obtained through crime are criminal proceeds; income derived from criminal proceeds such as interest and rent are criminal proceeds income. The New Interpretation continues this connotation, providing a basis for case-handling agencies to identify illicit money, goods, and their derived income. For example, rent collected by an upstream criminal from leasing stolen property belongs to "criminal proceeds income," and downstream acts of concealing and hiding such rent can be legally prosecuted.

The latter half of this article further lists typical means covered by the "other methods" stipulated in Article 312 of the Criminal Law. The law defines the methods of concealing and hiding criminal proceeds as "harboring, transferring, purchasing, selling on behalf, or other methods" to conceal or hide stolen goods and their income. The 2015 interpretation provided examples of "other methods," such as assisting in converting funds into securities or remitting abroad, which should be recognized as "other methods." The New Interpretation now includes various frequently occurring concealment and hiding methods in practice. For example: receiving and holding stolen goods, using stolen goods for personal use or processing and resale, providing financial accounts for criminal fund circulation, converting property forms, transferring funds through bank transfers or non-bank payment channels, and cross-border transfer of criminal proceeds. These are all "any means sufficient to conceal or hide criminal proceeds and their income." Although the list is not exhaustive, it clarifies the recognition approach: regardless of form changes, as long as the means can cover up the source or nature of illicit money or goods, they fall under the behaviors regulated by Article 312 of the Criminal Law.

The above provisions take into account criminals' continuous use of new technologies and channels to launder illicit funds nowadays. For example, new crimes have emerged involving the use of virtual currency and precious metal trading to transfer illegal funds. The New Interpretation's enumeration provides clear legal basis for this, helping to timely include such covert methods within the scope of criminal law regulation.

Article 2 The "knowing" stipulated in Article 312 of the Criminal Law includes both actual knowledge and constructive knowledge. It should be comprehensively reviewed and judged based on the information the actor has accessed or received, the handling of others' criminal proceeds and their income, the types and amounts of criminal proceeds and income, the methods of transfer and conversion, abnormal transaction behaviors and financial accounts, combined with the actor's professional experience, relationship with upstream criminals, and their statements and defenses.

This article provides rules for reviewing and judging the subjective element "knowing" in the crime of concealing and hiding criminal proceeds. According to the Criminal Law definition, constituting this crime requires the actor to subjectively know that the property handled is criminal proceeds. "Knowing" here includes not only explicit awareness that the property is illegally obtained but also situations where knowledge is presumed due to circumstances. Simply put, the law allows presumption of "knowing" when evidence is sufficient but requires caution. The New Interpretation continues this principle: emphasizing strict legal recognition of subjective knowledge to prevent excessive objective attribution, while allowing comprehensive judgment based on multiple objective factors, without requiring the actor to have personally witnessed the upstream crime to establish knowledge.

In specific judgments, the New Interpretation lists nine aspects of consideration, covering the information the actor accessed, handling of stolen goods, types and amounts of stolen goods, methods of transfer and conversion, transaction or account abnormalities, as well as the actor's professional background, relationship with upstream criminals, and their own statements and defenses. Case-handling agencies should link these factors for comprehensive review. For example:

· Involved information: Whether the actor received warnings or alerts about the funds or items being suspected of crime; if there was a clear warning and the actor still continued, "should have known" can be presumed.

· Handling circumstances: How does the actor participate in disposing of stolen money and goods? Is it a simple one-time possession, or frequent and large-scale handling? Frequent and large-scale handling of others' property with abnormal profits, inconsistent with ordinary legal transactions, is easily recognized as knowing.

· Nature and amount of stolen goods: If the case involves obviously illegal large assets, an ordinary person should reasonably doubt their legitimacy. If such property is handled without inquiry, it is hard to claim ignorance. For example, a scrap recycling station purchasing good-quality road steel plates, communication cables, etc., at prices significantly below market value, with multiple large transactions, is enough to make the operator aware of the suspicion of stolen goods.

· Transfer methods: Are the means of transferring or converting stolen money and goods unconventional? For example, using virtual accounts, multi-level account transfers, virtual currency exchanges, multiple people splitting remittances, etc., with the actor involved. Without criminal intent, ordinary people rarely engage in these special steps. At this point, the entire operation process can be used to infer knowledge of illegal purposes.

· Transaction abnormalities: Are there abnormal signs during the transaction? For example, purchasing goods without asking the price, only seeking to exchange for goods, then quickly reselling; frequent interruptions in fund transactions with account freezes; suspicious identities of transaction parties, etc.

· Account abnormalities: If accounts controlled or provided by the actor show large, frequent unusual movements, cross-border remittances, etc., and the actor cannot provide reasonable explanations, it is often recognized that they know the account is used for money laundering.

· Professional background: Certain professionals, due to the nature of their work, should better understand which behaviors may involve crimes. For example, bank employees, bulk commodity traders, logistics workers, etc. If they violate norms to assist clients in transferring suspicious property, they are more easily recognized as "should know." For instance, scrap metal recyclers are legally obliged to verify the source of collected property; if they obviously violate common sense by purchasing property of unknown origin, their knowledge and intent are more easily presumed.

· Degree of closeness: If the actor has a close relationship with upstream criminals and learns that the other party suddenly possesses a large amount of property without normal economic sources, then helps handle that property, the possibility of presumed knowledge significantly increases. Conversely, if it is truly a one-time accidental entrusted transport with normal payment and no familiarity with the other party, there may be a lack of basis for knowing.

· Confession and defense: Is the actor's explanation of the source of the involved property consistent and reasonable? If they claim ignorance but their explanation is full of loopholes or cannot explain why they are willing to frequently purchase valuable items at low prices, a comprehensive judgment can be made with other evidence. Of course, if the actor's confession can reasonably exclude knowledge and is supported by evidence, the principle favorable to the defendant should be followed, and the recognition standard should not be excessively raised.

The new "Interpretation" particularly emphasizes "cautious use of presumption." Although it allows inferring the actor's subjective knowledge based on the above objective factors, it must be based on rigorous evidence review to prevent conviction solely on objective behavior. The Criminal Procedure Law emphasizes the principle of evidence-based judgment; presuming knowledge should also follow the standard of excluding reasonable doubt. If the actor's explanation is reasonable and cannot be refuted by evidence, even if the objective behavior is suspicious, it is not advisable to rashly determine knowledge. For this reason, the 2021 "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Telecom Network Fraud, etc. (II)" by the two highest courts and one ministry also stipulate strict conditions for recognizing "knowledge" in helping transfer fraud funds, requiring a comprehensive judgment based on multiple factors and not uniformly upgrading it to the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds. Article 2 of the new "Interpretation" aligns with this spirit, aiming to balance crime fighting and preventing miscarriages of justice.

Article 3: When handling criminal cases of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and the proceeds of crime, the nature and social harm of the upstream crime, the circumstances, consequences, and degree of obstruction to judicial order caused by concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and their proceeds should be comprehensively considered for legal conviction and punishment.

This article establishes the comprehensive conviction standard for the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds. This is an important guiding provision, marking that the conviction threshold for this crime is no longer mechanically based on the amount but requires a comprehensive assessment of upstream and downstream crimes and the harmfulness of the behavior to decide whether to convict.

In the 2015 judicial interpretation, the conviction standard for the crime of concealing or disguising was mainly reflected by listing specific circumstances that should be convicted. These provisions largely limited the boundary between crime and non-crime but did not specify a unified amount threshold at that time, instead indirectly reflecting quantity requirements through specific circumstances (e.g., "total value reaching a certain amount" was classified as "serious circumstances" rather than a direct conviction standard). However, with changes in crime trends, such provisions became too rigid, sometimes resulting in extremes such as "small amounts but great harm" or "large amounts but minor circumstances." Simply judging by amount may not be entirely fair. Especially in new crimes like telecom network fraud, downstream concealing or disguising often manifests as gang assembly line operations; even if single amounts are small, cumulative harm is huge and highly coupled with upstream crimes. Sticking to amount thresholds may condone crime; conversely, some actors involved with large amounts but are first offenders or coerced with limited harm, mechanical prosecution contradicts the policy of balancing leniency and severity.

In view of this, the Supreme Court in 2021 amended decisions to introduce a "comprehensive judgment of amount + circumstances" conviction standard. Article 3 of the new "Interpretation" continues this spirit: comprehensively considering multiple factors to decide crime or non-crime. Specifically including: the nature and social harm of upstream crimes, the circumstances and consequences of concealing or disguising behavior itself, and the degree of obstruction to judicial order. In other words, case handlers should not rely solely on the amount involved but consider the case in the overall upstream and downstream context:

· Nature/harm of upstream crime: If the upstream crime itself is severe and highly harmful (e.g., telecom fraud, organized crime), even if the downstream concealing behavior involves a small amount, it may still require severe punishment for promoting serious crime. Conversely, if the upstream crime is relatively minor (e.g., small theft in general property crime), the decision to convict downstream behavior can be more cautiously weighed.

· Circumstances of concealing or disguising behavior: Are the downstream methods covert and clever, frequent, or forming an industrial chain? For example, using professional anti-surveillance techniques, cross-border transfers, gang division of labor, etc. If these circumstances are severe, even with small amounts, the social harm is considerable and should be considered for conviction.

· Consequences of behavior: Does the downstream behavior cause stolen money and goods to be unrecoverable, or cause irreparable victim losses? If so, it indicates significant harm to victims' rights and judicial asset recovery, warranting legal punishment. Conversely, if all stolen money and goods have been recovered and the actor's role is limited, leniency or even non-criminal treatment may be considered.

· Degree of obstruction to justice: How much does the act of concealment and cover-up hinder investigation and litigation? For example, whether accounts are destroyed or altered, key evidence is hidden, or the principal offender is harbored causing them to evade justice for a long time. If it seriously obstructs the judicial authorities in investigating upstream crimes, strict conviction should be applied; conversely, if there is cooperation in recovering stolen property or assisting in arrests, it reflects remorse and may be treated leniently.

By comprehensively considering the above factors, judicial authorities can handle concealment and cover-up more fairly, achieving the effect of "punishing when necessary and not punishing when unnecessary." The new "Interpretation" clearly proposes two guiding principles: first, for concealment and cover-up involving small amounts but closely related to upstream crimes, with severe circumstances and great harm, conviction and punishment can be applied—this ensures that those who are a "key link" in major crimes do not escape due to low amounts; second, for concealment and cover-up involving large amounts but loosely related, with minor circumstances and less harm, prosecution may be waived or punishment exempted—reflecting a balanced approach and avoiding a "one-size-fits-all" treatment. For example, if someone is entrusted to exchange 100,000 yuan of unknown origin cash, with low subjective malice and actively returns it, non-prosecution may be considered; whereas another person who handled only 10,000 yuan of stolen funds, but that amount is part of a series of telecom fraud cases involving millions, and their role in disposing of the stolen goods obstructed police recovery, should be convicted according to law.

It should be noted that "comprehensive consideration" does not mean there are no standards. On the contrary, it requires judicial personnel to weigh various factors within the framework of criminal law restraint and strict crime suppression, ultimately deciding whether to prosecute. For borderline cases, the prosecution may use the mechanism of non-prosecution due to doubt, Conditional non-prosecution and other mechanisms to control entry, while courts may use measures such as exempting punishment or declaring probation to achieve a balanced and moderate case handling effect. This spirit is also consistent with the "risk-based" principle in the Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People's Republic of China: focusing limited law enforcement resources on the most harmful behaviors. The comprehensive conviction standards in Article 3 of the new "Interpretation" are precisely to accurately target serious concealment and cover-up crimes, while distinguishing those with significantly minor circumstances according to law.

Article 4 Concealment and cover-up of criminal proceeds and their benefits: If the offender pleads guilty and accepts punishment and actively cooperates in recovering the criminal proceeds and their benefits, and meets one of the following conditions, and the circumstances are minor, non-prosecution or exemption from criminal punishment may be applied:
(1) Having statutory circumstances for lenient punishment;
(2) Concealing and covering up criminal proceeds and their benefits for close relatives, and being a first-time or occasional offender;
(3) Playing a significant role in assisting judicial authorities in investigating upstream crimes;
(4) Other circumstances that are minor and not harmful.

This article stipulates the circumstances under which concealment and cover-up of criminal proceeds can be treated leniently when the circumstances are minor, equivalent to listing typical cases for applying Article 37 of the Criminal Law (exemption from punishment) or relative non-prosecution. Simply put, it provides guidance for situations where "punishment may not be necessary" or "criminal responsibility may not be pursued," reflecting a balanced criminal policy.

First, the prerequisite for applying this article is that the offender has pleaded guilty and accepted punishment and actively assisted in recovering stolen funds and goods. This aligns with the current leniency system for guilty pleas in criminal proceedings. The Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China and related regulations clearly state that suspects who voluntarily plead guilty, sign a guilty plea statement, and show remorse may be treated leniently according to law. This article introduces this principle, requiring that only when the offender pleads guilty and actively cooperates in recovery will subsequent non-prosecution or exemption measures be considered. This prevents those who do not plead guilty from trying to evade punishment and encourages suspects and defendants to actively return stolen property and assist in solving upstream cases, maximizing loss recovery.

After meeting the above prerequisites, this article lists four specific circumstances:

1. Having statutory circumstances for lenient punishment. Statutory leniency includes situations explicitly stipulated in the General Principles of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, such as voluntary surrender, meritorious service, juvenile offenders, and accomplices under duress, which should or may be given lighter or mitigated punishment. If the person concealing and covering up criminal proceeds has these circumstances and the overall case is minor, non-prosecution or exemption from punishment may be considered. This effectively elevates statutory mitigating circumstances to possible exemption, further reflecting a balanced approach.

2. Concealing and covering up for close relatives, and being a first-time or occasional offender. This clause takes human nature into account. In practice, many concealment and cover-up acts occur among family members or close friends. For example, children hiding bribery money for parents, or a wife helping her husband transfer stolen goods. Although these acts are criminal, due to familial affection, subjective malice may be relatively small. If the offender is a first-time or occasional offender, leniency may be granted for such familial crimes. Similar provisions existed in the 2015 judicial interpretation. Of course, the general requirement of "minor circumstances" must also be met; if the amount involved is huge or the offender repeatedly participates in disposing of stolen goods, legal punishment should still apply.

3. Actively cooperating in investigating upstream crimes and playing a significant role. This is a new clause in the new "Interpretation." The 2015 interpretation did not include this in exemption conditions. Its inclusion aims to encourage those who conceal and cover up criminal proceeds to assist in solving major upstream cases. "Playing a significant role" means, for example, the offender provides key clues that help capture the principal offender upstream or solve a major case, but their own conduct does not meet the standard for meritorious service (which requires a "major role"). In such cases, leniency may be considered. This reflects a comprehensive consideration of the relationship between concealment crimes and upstream crimes: through policy incentives, assisting in eradicating upstream crime sources. For example, a fence who, after being apprehended, actively provides police with information about upstream theft gang hideouts, helping recover a large amount of stolen property. Although this does not constitute meritorious service, it has significant assistance value, and judicial authorities may choose not to prosecute or exempt punishment to encourage such behavior.

4. Other circumstances that are minor and not harmful. This is a catch-all clause. In practice, there are countless variations and it is impossible to list all. In some special cases, concealment and cover-up acts are indeed illegal but cause minimal harm, such as temporarily holding a few thousand yuan of stolen money for a friend and quickly handing it over, or withdrawing immediately after unknowingly getting involved. As long as the overall case is considered not harmful, it can be included in this clause for lenient treatment. It should be noted that "not harmful" includes both minor social harm and relatively small subjective malice of the offender. In such scenarios, the preventive and educational functions of punishment can be replaced by other means, such as admonition or ordering a written repentance.

This provision fully implements the principle of combining leniency with severity and is consistent with the "but clause" in Article 13 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China regarding crimes (where significantly minor and less harmful circumstances are not considered crimes). For borderline cases, Article 4 essentially provides a statutory basis for exemption from crime: if the listed circumstances are met, it can serve as a basis for "not considering it a crime" or exempting from punishment.

Two points need to be emphasized: first, "may" not prosecute or exempt from punishment means that judicial authorities are granted discretion rather than compulsion. Even if the above circumstances exist but there are other significant adverse factors, judicial authorities can still prosecute and punish according to law, but leniency is generally advisable. Second, the application of this article still requires meeting the substantive condition of "minor circumstances." If the facts of the act are not minor, merely having one of the circumstances is insufficient for exemption. For example, if someone is a first-time offender and hides stolen goods for relatives or friends, but hides a huge amount of stolen money causing serious consequences, it should not be considered "minor circumstances" and criminal responsibility should still be pursued.

Article 5: For upstream crimes such as illegal mining with relatively high sentencing standards, if the amount of disguised or concealed criminal proceeds and their gains reaches more than five million yuan and one of the following circumstances exists, it can be recognized as "serious circumstances" as stipulated in the first paragraph of Article 312 of the Criminal Law:
(1) Repeatedly carrying out acts of disguise or concealment;
(2) Knowing that the disguised or concealed criminal proceeds and their gains are specific items such as power equipment, transportation facilities, broadcasting and television facilities, public telecommunications facilities, military facilities, or funds for disaster relief, rescue, flood control, preferential treatment, immigration, relief, epidemic prevention, social donations, social insurance funds, etc., yet still carrying out disguise or concealment;
(3) Refusing to cooperate with the recovery of property, resulting in the inability to recover stolen money or goods;
(4) Causing losses of more than 2.5 million yuan;
(5) Other circumstances that are serious.

For upstream crimes other than those specified in the preceding paragraph, if the amount of disguised or concealed criminal proceeds and their gains reaches more than 500,000 yuan and one of the circumstances specified in items (1), (2), (3), or (5) of the preceding paragraph exists, or if losses exceed 250,000 yuan, it can be recognized as "serious circumstances" as stipulated in the first paragraph of Article 312 of the Criminal Law.

When recognizing "serious circumstances," attention should be paid to maintaining sentencing balance with the upstream crime.

This article refines the criteria for recognizing "serious circumstances" (aggravating factors) under Article 312 of the Criminal Law. Essentially, it clarifies under what conditions the crime of disguising or concealing criminal proceeds should be subject to a higher sentencing range of three to seven years imprisonment. Compared with the 2015 judicial interpretation, the new "Interpretation" makes significant adjustments and optimizations to the "serious circumstances" standard: it adopts a dual restriction model that distinguishes types of upstream crimes, raises some amount thresholds, and adds necessary aggravating conditions.

· Two-tier amount standards, distinguishing upstream and downstream crime types: The 2015 interpretation uniformly set the amount standard for "serious circumstances" as the total value of stolen goods reaching more than 100,000 yuan, supplemented by frequency and other conditions. This standard was acceptable for most ordinary property crime downstream cases at the time, but in practice, sentencing inversion problems gradually emerged: some upstream crimes have "huge amount" standards higher than 100,000 yuan, such as embezzlement and illegal mining, where tens of thousands of yuan are required to enter the heavy sentence range. If downstream disguise crimes are uniformly set at 100,000 yuan for "serious circumstances," it may cause the downstream crime to more easily trigger heavy sentences than the upstream main crime, which is inconsistent with the principle of proportionality between crime and punishment. Therefore, Article 5 of the new "Interpretation" adopts a "dual-track system":

The first track applies to upstream crimes with relatively high sentencing standards (typically illegal mining, embezzlement, etc., where the "huge amount" threshold is much higher than ordinary theft or fraud). In this case, the amount standard for downstream disguise or concealment is raised to more than 5 million yuan to be recognized as "serious circumstances."

The second track targets upstream crimes that are other ordinary property crimes (such as theft, fraud, robbery, etc., where the "huge amount" threshold is usually around 50,000 to 100,000 yuan). For these cases, the amount standard for downstream disguise or concealment remains at the lower threshold of 500,000 yuan to consider "serious circumstances."

The logic of this distinction is: for upstream crimes that only enter heavy sentencing at "particularly huge amounts" (such as illegal mining exceeding 500,000 yuan to be sentenced to more than three years), the downstream disguise behavior must reach a higher amount (5 million yuan) to enter the heavy sentence range, avoiding easily surpassing the upstream crime's sentence; for upstream crimes with lower thresholds (such as theft where 30,000 yuan is already "huge amount"), the downstream behavior's heavy sentence line at 500,000 yuan is more reasonable and should not be set too high, otherwise the punishment for disguise crimes would be too light and not conducive to crime control. This design balances sentencing between upstream and downstream crimes.

· Amount + circumstances "dual restriction": The new "Interpretation" stipulates that whether at the 5 million yuan or 500,000 yuan level, merely reaching the amount is not enough; certain aggravating circumstances must also be met to recognize "serious circumstances." The specific aggravating circumstances include five items, basically consistent with the 2015 version with slight modifications:

· Multiple occurrences: meaning repeatedly disguising or concealing criminal proceeds. This is generally understood as two or more times constituting "multiple." It should be noted that if it is the same upstream crime with multiple sales of stolen goods, it should be integrated and recognized according to the situation, not mechanically accumulated. This circumstance emphasizes the continuity of behavior and recidivism tendency, indicating deeper subjective malice.

· Stolen goods belong to specific items: listing a series of special types such as power equipment, transportation facilities, broadcasting and television facilities, public telecommunications facilities, military facilities, and funds for disaster relief, rescue, flood control, preferential treatment, immigration, relief, epidemic prevention, social donations, social insurance funds, etc. These items or funds mostly have public attributes or special uses, and crimes involving them are more harmful. Knowing that these are specific stolen goods yet still disguising or concealing them has a bad social impact and is therefore listed as an aggravating circumstance. The 2015 interpretation had similar provisions. The prerequisite for meeting this item is that the stolen goods belong to one of the above types and the actor knowingly conceals them.

· Refusing to cooperate with recovery, resulting in inability to recover stolen goods: meaning the actor refuses to disclose the whereabouts of stolen goods or hand over stolen money, making recovery difficult. This reflects the actor's resistance to justice and allowing victim losses to expand, which is serious. When the disguise or concealment behavior itself obstructs recovery efforts, it should be evaluated more severely.

· Causing significant loss: The new "Interpretation" distinguishes different amounts for upstream and downstream types: if the upstream is a high-standard crime, a loss of over 2.5 million yuan can be considered an aggravating circumstance; if the upstream is an ordinary crime, a loss of over 250,000 yuan suffices. Here, "loss" generally refers to the irrecoverable part of public or private property loss directly caused by concealment or cover-up acts. For example, the economic loss amount caused to the victim due to the disappearance of stolen goods through fencing. The 2015 interpretation had a similar expression as "causing irrecoverable loss of public or private property" but did not specify a monetary threshold. The new regulation clarifies specific numerical standards, making it more operable. It is necessary to determine the loss amount and the causal relationship with the concealment act based on the specific case.

· Other serious circumstances: A catch-all provision covering situations not explicitly listed but sufficient to be recognized as serious. For example, concealment acts causing major social impact or disrupting financial market order can be included according to the circumstances.

Only when both "amount reaches the standard" and "one of the above circumstances is met" are satisfied can it be recognized as "serious circumstances" and thus apply aggravated sentencing. This "double restriction" model reflects legislative rigor: if either the amount or circumstance is insufficient, upgrading is not easily done, avoiding heavy punishment based on a single factor. This aligns with the principle of proportionality between crime and punishment and helps maximize asset recovery and protect victims' rights. Especially for concealment cases involving huge amounts, additional恶劣情节 (malicious circumstances) are required to prevent heavier penalties solely due to large amounts, allowing differentiation for cases where "although the amount is large, the harm is not fully manifested."

Finally, this article particularly emphasizes maintaining balance with upstream crime sentencing. This is a guiding principle throughout the recognition of "serious circumstances." Judges applying this article should compare the sentencing baseline and range of downstream concealment crimes with the corresponding upstream crime penalties to prevent unreasonable situations where "downstream is heavier than upstream."

Article 6 The amount of concealed or hidden criminal proceeds and their gains shall be based on the time the concealment or hiding act is carried out. If the purchase or sale price of the property is higher than its actual value, the purchase or sale price shall be used for calculation.

If the concealment or hiding of criminal proceeds and their gains is carried out multiple times without administrative penalties and should be prosecuted according to law, the amount of criminal proceeds and gains shall be cumulatively calculated.

This article stipulates the calculation method of the amount involved in cases of concealment or hiding of criminal proceeds, including the recognition standard for a single crime amount and the principle of accumulation in multiple crime situations. These rules are basically consistent with the 2015 judicial interpretation, maintaining effective practices in application.

First, the calculation time point of the amount should be based on the time the concealment or hiding act is carried out. This means that if the value of the stolen goods fluctuates after acquisition, subsequent changes are not considered in the calculation. For example: a certain painting was worth 500,000 yuan at the time of upstream theft, but the downstream actor only sold it for 300,000 yuan when fencing it, so the amount for concealment crime is calculated as 300,000 yuan; conversely, if the value was 50,000 yuan at theft but rose to 100,000 yuan at sale, then 100,000 yuan is recognized. Using the time of the act helps accurately evaluate the actual property value handled by the downstream actor and avoids uncertainty from upstream crime circumstances affecting downstream. After all, concealment is an independent crime and should be measured by the actual value of property the actor contacts to assess social harm.

Second, for high-price purchase or sale situations, the transaction price is used for calculation rather than the actual value. This prevents actors from evading the law by using abnormally high prices. For example: stolen goods actually worth 100,000 yuan but the actor knowingly "purchases" at 150,000 yuan to raise the threshold and appear not to fence at a low price. In this case, the amount is calculated as 150,000 yuan, and the harm evaluation cannot be lowered because of the "high offer." Similarly, if the actor sells stolen goods at above market price on behalf of others, the transaction price should be used for heavier punishment. This provision closes the loophole of criminals "laundering" stolen goods with high prices.

Finally, for multiple concealment acts, it is clarified that the amount of criminal proceeds should be cumulatively calculated. But two conditions must be met: (1) no prior administrative penalties for these acts; (2) the amount reaches the criminal prosecution standard. The first point means if someone repeatedly fences small amounts and has been administratively punished, subsequent acts can be evaluated as new crimes separately without accumulating previously punished parts. But if before criminal prosecution the multiple acts were not dealt with or only received public security treatment, these acts should be combined and amounts added to decide if criminal prosecution standards are met. For example: Person A purchased stolen goods 5 times in 2022, each worth 10,000 yuan. Each single purchase does not reach the local theft crime threshold (assuming 3,000 yuan, which is met, but concealment crime may require circumstances under old standards), but because not caught, only after the 5th time is A arrested. The cumulative value is 50,000 yuan and should be handled as a criminal case, not exempted due to small dispersed amounts. This provision reflects strictness on repeat fencing: even if each act is small, multiple acts still require criminal responsibility. The 2015 interpretation has a nearly identical expression emphasizing "if no administrative penalty and prosecution is required by law, amounts are cumulative."

In practice, there are two key points for accumulation of multiple acts: first, confirm that multiple acts are of the same nature and meet prosecution necessity. For example, if the actor is involved in fencing and money laundering, they are evaluated separately; if some acts were not crimes at the time but later laws changed prosecution standards, time effect issues must be considered. Second, if some acts have already been investigated or administratively punished, those parts are generally not repeatedly accumulated to avoid double punishment.

In summary, Article 6 is technically complex but crucial for accurately determining the total involved amount and legal evaluation of cases. It ensures fairness in amount recognition and effectiveness of penalties. It also guides investigative agencies to collect evidence and try to clarify all times and amounts of concealment acts to comprehensively judge criminal responsibility.

Article 7 If there is prior collusion with perpetrators of theft, robbery, fraud, snatching, etc., and concealment or hiding of criminal proceeds and gains constitutes a crime, it shall be treated as complicity in theft, robbery, fraud, snatching, etc., respectively.

This article clarifies the handling principle when the person concealing or hiding criminal proceeds colludes in advance with the upstream criminal: in this case, the downstream act is no longer independently evaluated as concealment of criminal proceeds but treated as complicity in the upstream crime. This provision is fully consistent with the corresponding clause in the 2015 judicial interpretation, reflecting the criminal law's consistent stance on prior collusion.

The so-called "prior collusion" refers to a situation where, before or during the upstream crime, the party who conceals and hides the stolen goods has already reached a criminal intent agreement with the upstream criminals, prearranging to be responsible for harboring and disposing of the stolen goods after the crime is successful. For example, in a theft gang with clear division of labor, one person is responsible for stealing, and another for disposing of the stolen goods, and they have agreed to share the loot before the theft. In this case, the disposer is not an accidental participant after the theft but has joined the overall criminal plan in advance. According to the theory of complicity in criminal law, the disposer effectively becomes a member or accomplice of the upstream criminal group, and their actions are part of the main crime rather than a separate downstream crime.

This article lists typical upstream crimes such as theft, robbery, fraud, and snatching. These are property crimes that usually involve stolen goods that need to be dealt with. If a person agrees to provide after-the-fact assistance before these crimes occur, their status is equivalent to a "prior aider in disposing of stolen goods." According to the general principles of criminal law, accomplices include organizers, helpers, instigators, etc. Although the disposer helps hide the stolen goods after the crime, due to prior collusion, the law treats them as joint offenders and punishes them as accomplices to the main crime. For example, if A and B conspire with A breaking in to steal and B responsible for disposing of the stolen goods afterward, and after the theft B disposes of the goods and obtains money, then although B specifically commits the act of disposing, due to prior collusion, B should be punished as an accomplice to theft and not separately for concealing stolen goods.

The importance of this handling principle is to prevent offenders from exploiting legal loopholes. Otherwise, if prior collusion in disposing of stolen goods is only punishable as concealing stolen goods, it may lead to an imbalance where the principal offender receives a heavy sentence while the accomplice is lightly punished, which is insufficient to deter organized crime. Therefore, by converting the act into complicity in the main crime, it can be punished according to the statutory penalties for theft or robbery, which are usually heavier than simple concealment. This reflects the criminal law principle of severely punishing joint crimes and sentencing according to the more serious offense.

It should be noted that the key to applying this article lies in the term "prior." If the disposer only learns of and participates after the upstream crime is completed, there is no collusion, and they cannot be deemed an accomplice but should be evaluated separately as committing the crime of concealing stolen goods. This effectively distinguishes the boundary between prior assistance and after-the-fact assistance. In judicial practice, proving "prior collusion" requires evidence such as communication records or confessions from conspirators. If prior agreement cannot be proven, even if the disposer actively disposes of the goods, it is generally treated as concealing stolen goods without expanding the interpretation of complicity.

Additionally, this article only lists theft, robbery, fraud, and snatching as examples. The word "etc." implies other similar property crimes such as embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds. If there is prior collusion to help hide stolen money, it should also be treated as complicity in the corresponding main crime, although such crimes may less frequently involve "prior arrangements to dispose of stolen goods."

In summary, this article actually establishes the rule for handling the concurrence relationship between concealing stolen goods and upstream crimes: when prior collusion exists, the act of concealing is absorbed by the upstream crime and does not constitute an independent offense; conversely, if done independently afterward, each constitutes its own crime and is punished accordingly. Judicial handling should determine collusion based on evidence and correctly apply this provision to prevent both downgrading true joint offenders and elevating innocent uninformed persons to principal accomplices.

Article 8: Those who commit theft, robbery, fraud, snatching, or similar acts against criminal proceeds and their benefits, constituting a crime, shall be convicted and punished according to the crimes of theft, robbery, fraud, snatching, etc.

This article stipulates another situation of crime concurrence or distinction: if theft, robbery, fraud, or snatching is committed again against criminal proceeds themselves, the offender should be convicted and punished directly according to the corresponding crime, rather than being charged with concealing or hiding criminal proceeds. This clarifies that when the act itself constitutes a new independent property crime, even if the object is criminal proceeds, it is treated as a new crime rather than concealment.

For example: A steals an electric bike and hides it. B, whether unaware or even aware, steals or robs the bike again. B's act should be recognized as theft or robbery, not concealing or hiding criminal proceeds. Because B commits a complete theft or robbery against A, infringing on A's possession rights as the property holder (although A is a thief). This new infringement of legal interests does not transform into concealment simply because the object is stolen goods but is treated as an ordinary property crime.

Another example: C defrauds the money obtained by fraudster D through crime. C's act constitutes fraud and will not be recognized as concealing or hiding criminal proceeds. Simply put, if there is theft, robbery, or fraud relationship among criminals, it is handled conventionally and not specialized because the victim is an "upstream criminal." This provision ensures the accuracy of criminal law evaluation: the crime is defined according to the behavior pattern, avoiding using concealment, a "judicial obstruction crime," to cover acts that should be treated as direct property crimes.

This principle has long been a judicial consensus but is explicitly listed in this interpretation for ease of case handling. In practice, there may be misunderstandings: some think stealing stolen goods is "harboring stolen goods." Actually, stealing stolen goods is still theft, only the victim is the original criminal. The law protects lawful property ownership but also acknowledges that thieves have possession relations to the stolen property. If a third party steals again, it still disrupts possession order and constitutes theft. Concealment is helping criminals hide stolen goods, targeting judicial order and recovery interests, and differs from the crime of re-taking property.

Moreover, this article uses the restriction "constituting a crime," indicating that if the above acts on stolen goods do not reach the level of a crime, they may not constitute concealment and should be judged according to specific circumstances for legality. But once these acts meet the crime threshold, they are uniformly classified as theft, robbery, etc., without considering concealment.

Article 9: Knowing that the property and its proceeds are criminally obtained and concealing or hiding them constitutes the crime of concealing or hiding criminal proceeds. If it also constitutes other crimes, the heavier penalty shall apply.

This article is a general provision on concurrence, aimed at resolving the principle of conviction when concealing or hiding criminal proceeds may coincide with other crimes. It is a specific application of the common criminal law rule of "choosing the heavier penalty among multiple offenses."

Simply put, when the same act meets the elements of both concealing or hiding criminal proceeds and other crimes, the heavier statutory penalty should be applied, and multiple punishments should not be imposed. This means if the concealment act "violates another crime" with a heavier penalty, it will no longer be evaluated as concealment. This situation may occur in practice, for example:

· The actor knowingly provides an account to help transfer funds obtained from others' embezzlement or bribery. From the behavioral characteristics, it may simultaneously meet the elements of the crime of concealing and disguising criminal proceeds and the crime of money laundering (Article 191 of the Criminal Law), because money laundering targets the transfer of property obtained from specific upstream crimes (such as embezzlement and bribery). The statutory penalty for money laundering is higher than that for concealment (up to ten years), and it is a special law. According to this article, the crime should be convicted and punished as money laundering with heavier penalties, and concealment should no longer be recognized. This follows the principle that special laws prevail over general laws and reflects the relationship between Article 312 as the general money laundering offense and Article 191 as the special money laundering offense in the Criminal Law.

· For example, if the actor participates in transferring illicit funds to conceal drug crime proceeds, they may simultaneously violate the crime of concealment and the crime of harboring, transferring, or concealing drugs and drug-related proceeds (Article 349, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Law). The latter specifically regulates drug crime proceeds, with statutory penalties similar to or slightly heavier than concealment. According to this article and criminal law theory, it should be handled as the drug-related crime (special provision) and not as concealment.

· Similarly, if the actor conceals or disguises property obtained from terrorist activities, it may also constitute specific crimes such as financing terrorism. When the statutory penalty for financing terrorism is heavier than that for concealment, the crime should be charged as financing terrorism.

This article emphasizes the principle of "conviction and punishment according to the heavier penalty," which is essentially the principle of resolving concurrent offenses by the heavier penalty. That is, if a single act overlaps with multiple criminal provisions in the Criminal Law, the one with the heavier penalty should be chosen. Legislation does not provide for punishing one act with two crimes simultaneously in such cases.

It should be noted that the premise of this article is that the act simultaneously constitutes concealment and other crimes. Articles 7 and 8 actually explain situations where "simultaneous constitution" does not occur under special circumstances. Therefore, Article 9 mainly targets situations where the act indeed meets both the elements of concealment and other crimes, such as the specific crimes mentioned above like money laundering, drug-related crimes, financing terrorism, or helping criminals escape.

In judicial practice, the most common is the concurrence of money laundering and concealment. The "Judicial Interpretation on Handling Money Laundering Criminal Cases" clearly states that concealment and money laundering have a general law and special law relationship; if the act meets the criteria for money laundering, money laundering should be applied preferentially. The new Interpretation's Article 9 echoes this provision. For example, in the case of aiding and abetting and concealment, if the actor knowingly provides transfer of fraud proceeds, it constitutes concealment; if knowledge cannot be established, it may be aiding and abetting. Strictly speaking, there is generally no "simultaneous constitution" issue between the two but rather a choice based on evidence. If theoretical concurrence occurs, the heavier penalty should be chosen. In summary, Article 9 provides a catch-all rule for handling concurrence to avoid duplicate evaluation or penalty inversion.

In summary, Article 9 ensures the principle of resolving concurrence by the heavier penalty in the application of criminal law, avoiding unfairness or imbalance caused by duplicate evaluation. When applying it, case handlers should first confirm whether the act truly "violates multiple legal provisions by one act." If so, the one with the highest statutory penalty should be chosen for conviction; if it is not concurrence but multiple acts and multiple crimes, it should be handled separately according to principles like hypothetical concurrence or related offenses, and this article does not apply. Regarding concealment, due to its special status in the money laundering crime system, related concurrence issues are relatively clear: if the act meets the criteria for money laundering or other special crimes, this crime generally does not apply; otherwise, it is applied as a fallback.

Article 10: The recognition of the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds or proceeds from criminal activities is premised on the existence of upstream criminal facts.

If the upstream criminal facts have been verified as true, but the actor has not yet been apprehended, or due to the actor's death or lack of criminal responsibility, criminal responsibility is not pursued according to law, this does not affect the recognition of the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds or proceeds from criminal activities.

Article 10 actually clarifies the requirements for upstream crimes when handling cases of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds: on one hand, there must be a real upstream crime as a premise; on the other hand, even if the upstream criminal is not convicted or cannot be held accountable, as long as the upstream criminal facts are conclusive, the downstream concealment can still be convicted.

First, the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds is a typical derivative or accessory crime. Its establishment is premised on the existence of "criminal proceeds of others." This means that if there is no upstream crime at all (no one committed the upstream crime), there is no "criminal proceeds," and the downstream act naturally does not constitute this crime. This also reflects that the term "criminal proceeds" in the crime limits the source. For example, if person A casually helps someone keep money, and that money is not criminal proceeds, even if it is later confirmed to be legal, A's act does not constitute concealment. The judiciary must prevent mistaking normal civil acts for concealment of criminal proceeds by verifying upstream criminal facts.

However, in practice, upstream criminal facts are sometimes difficult to fully verify in detail, or the upstream criminal may not be apprehended. The second paragraph of this article provides flexible handling: as long as it can be verified that an upstream crime indeed occurred, even if the upstream actor has not been apprehended or cannot be held accountable for special reasons, it does not affect the recognition of concealment. In other words, the establishment of downstream concealment does not require an upstream crime to have a judgment or a specific defendant convicted. As long as it is proven that criminal proceeds exist. For example:

· A batch of cash can be proven to come from telecom fraud because there are victim reports and fund flow evidence, but the fraudster has not been caught. For those who help transfer this cash, they can still be convicted of concealing criminal proceeds. At this time, the upstream fraud crime facts are "verified as true," and although the principal has not been apprehended, it does not prevent punishing the person disposing of the proceeds.

· For example, a thirteen-year-old minor stole something. Although no criminal responsibility is pursued against him, if an adult helps dispose of the stolen goods, the theft is still a "criminal fact," and the disposer constitutes concealment. The minor not being punished does not mean the act is legal; the stolen goods are still criminal proceeds.

This provision continues the content of the 2015 interpretation. Its spirit is to prevent concealment from being unprocessable due to upstream case human factors. If the upstream offender must be convicted, the disposer might delay or evade. Now it is clear that even if no one is sentenced upstream, as long as the facts are clear, the downstream can be convicted, ensuring judicial independence and efficiency.

Of course, this also imposes requirements on case handlers: they must prove by evidence that "an upstream crime indeed exists." In short, the first half of Article 10 establishes that where this crime exists, the other crime must exist; the second half prevents the misunderstanding that "if no one is convicted upstream, this crime cannot be convicted." Together, they ensure neither "prosecution without source" nor "case dismissal due to persons."

Article 11: When a unit commits the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and their benefits, the unit shall be fined according to the corresponding natural person crime conviction and sentencing standards stipulated in this interpretation, and the directly responsible supervisors and other directly responsible personnel shall be convicted and punished.

Using the name of an organization to conceal or disguise criminal proceeds and their benefits, where the illegal gains are privately divided by the perpetrator, shall be convicted and punished according to the provisions on natural person crimes in the Criminal Law and judicial interpretations.

This article is divided into two paragraphs, addressing the handling of organizational crimes and preventing the evasion of law by using the name of an organization.

First, according to the Criminal Law, an organization can also constitute certain crimes, and the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds does not exclude the possibility of organizational crimes. For example, if a company knowingly helps a client transfer or launder funds that are criminal proceeds, the company itself and its responsible persons may constitute this crime. Article 11, paragraph 1 clearly states: for organizations that conceal or disguise criminal proceeds, the crime and its severity shall be determined according to the standards for natural person crimes, then the organization shall be fined, and the directly responsible supervisors and other directly responsible personnel shall be held criminally liable. This is essentially the general principle for handling organizational crimes, i.e., a dual penalty system: one penalty for the organization and one for the individual. The application of organizational crimes also requires meeting the general requirements of the Criminal Law for organizational crimes: the act is committed in the name of the organization, and the illegal gains belong to the organization. As long as it is confirmed that the act of fencing or money laundering is for the benefit of the organization, it shall be treated as an organizational crime. In addition, this article specifies that the determination of guilt and sentencing shall follow the corresponding standards for natural person crimes as stipulated in this interpretation, emphasizing that the amount and circumstances of organizational crimes must also comply with the provisions of previous articles in this interpretation.

Second, the second paragraph addresses a special situation: if the name of an organization is used to conceal or disguise criminal proceeds, but the illegal gains are privately divided by an individual, it shall be handled as a natural person crime. This means that if someone commits a crime under the guise of an organization, but the organization is unaware and does not benefit, it shall still be recognized as an individual crime.

In summary, this article aligns with the general provisions of the Criminal Law and the 2015 interpretation regarding "using an organization to commit crimes." Article 30 of the General Principles of the Criminal Law excludes the situation where "an organization is established by an individual for illegal criminal activities or the organization is used by others to commit crimes." The second paragraph of this article concretizes this spirit. It prevents criminals from using an organization as a front to shift responsibility to the organization, and such cases are still treated as individual crimes, thus avoiding missed or incorrect punishments due to nominal issues.

Article 12 This interpretation shall come into effect on August 26, 2025. Upon the promulgation and implementation of this interpretation, the "Supreme People's Court Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Criminal Cases of Concealing or Disguising Criminal Proceeds and the Benefits Thereof" (Fa Shi [2015] No. 11) and the "Supreme People's Court Decision on Amending the Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Criminal Cases of Concealing or Disguising Criminal Proceeds and the Benefits Thereof" (Fa Shi [2021] No. 8) shall be repealed simultaneously. In case of inconsistency between previous judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate and this interpretation, this interpretation shall prevail.

This article belongs to the effective and repeal clauses of the new "Interpretation," mainly containing three key points:

1. Effective date: Effective from August 26, 2025. This legally clarifies the effective date of the judicial interpretation. Cases tried after this date shall apply the provisions of this interpretation. Generally, cases concluded before the implementation of this interpretation shall not be retroactively corrected by the new standards (unless favorable to the defendant under the principle of applying the old law or the lighter penalty); cases not yet concluded or under investigation and prosecution, tried on or after August 26, 2025, shall be handled according to the new provisions.

2. Repeal of old interpretations: It clearly announces the simultaneous repeal of the 2015 judicial interpretation (Fa Shi [2015] No. 11) and the 2021 amendment decision (Fa Shi [2021] No. 8). In other words, the new "Interpretation" replaces all previous judicial interpretation provisions related to the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds. From now on, the 2015 version and the 2021 amendments shall no longer be effective. This means that judicial practice should no longer cite the old interpretation provisions and shall uniformly apply the new 2025 "Interpretation." For acts before August 26, 2025, if there is inconsistency between the new and old provisions, consideration should be given to applying the old law or the lighter penalty, but since this interpretation generally combines strictness and leniency, specific cases should be determined according to Article 12 of the Criminal Law to apply the most favorable to the defendant. For example, the new interpretation includes some minor malicious acts as crimes, which cannot be retroactively applied strictly to acts completed before the interpretation's implementation.

3. Continuity of similar interpretations: The last provision states: "In case of inconsistency between previous judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate and this interpretation, this interpretation shall prevail." This indicates that not only the two directly related interpretations of 2015 and 2021 are repealed, but also any other past judicial interpretations involving the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds (including jointly issued related provisions, such as "Opinions on Handling Cases of Telecom Network Fraud (II)"), if there is any conflict with the new "Interpretation," the new "Interpretation" shall prevail to ensure uniform application of the law.