Perspective | In-depth Interpretation of "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning Criminal Cases of Refusal to Execute Judgments and Rulings"
Published:
2025-07-04
The difficulty of enforcing judgments has been a long-standing problem in judicial practice. During the enforcement stage, some judgment debtors deliberately evade or resist enforcement, resulting in the legitimate rights and interests of the winning party being delayed. To solve this problem, judicial organs have continuously improved the regulatory measures for punishing those who refuse to execute judgments and rulings in recent years. In June 2025, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued the "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases of Refusal to Execute Judgments and Rulings" (No. 8 [2025] of the Supreme People's Court, hereinafter referred to as the "Opinions"). These Opinions came into effect on July 1, 2025, aiming to further improve the mechanism for handling crimes of refusing to enforce judgments and rulings and to help solve the current problem of enforcement difficulties. The Opinions consist of 20 articles, which provide specific regulations on the division of responsibilities and cooperation among the people's courts, people's procuratorates, and public security organs in cases of crimes of refusing to enforce judgments and rulings, covering the investigation, prosecution, private prosecution, and trial stages. This article will analyze and interpret each article of the Opinions, discuss the difficult problems that may be encountered in practice and propose countermeasures in conjunction with relevant judicial interpretations, focusing on the division of responsibilities and cooperation mechanisms among the three organs of public security, procuratorate, and court, and evaluating the applicability and significance of each clause.
Introduction
Difficulty in enforcement is a long-standing problem in judicial practice. During the enforcement stage, some judgment debtors deliberately evade or resist enforcement, resulting in the legitimate rights and interests of the winning party being delayed. To solve this problem, judicial organs have been continuously improving the regulatory measures for punishing those who refuse to execute judgments and rulings in recent years. In June 2025, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued the "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases of Refusal to Execute Judgments and Rulings" (Document No. 8 [2025] of the Supreme People's Court, hereinafter referred to as the "Opinions"). These Opinions came into effect on July 1, 2025, aiming to further improve the handling mechanism for crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings and to help solve the current problem of enforcement difficulties. This document consists of 20 articles, which, covering the stages of investigation, prosecution, private prosecution, and trial, provide specific regulations on the division of responsibilities and cooperation among the people's courts, people's procuratorates, and public security organs in handling crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings. This article will analyze and interpret each article of the Opinions, and combined with relevant judicial interpretations, discuss the difficult problems that may be encountered in practice and propose countermeasures. It will focus on analyzing the division of responsibilities and cooperation mechanisms among the three organs, and evaluate the applicability and significance of each clause.
I. Background and Significance of the Opinions
For a long time, people's courts have frequently encountered the phenomenon of judgment debtors evading enforcement during the execution of effective judgments. Many cases have resulted in failure to enforce or incomplete enforcement, causing social concerns about judicial authority and fairness and justice. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission attach great importance to the problem of enforcement difficulties. As early as 2005, they issued documents requiring political and legal organs to unify law enforcement thinking and increase efforts to crack down on acts of resisting enforcement. Article 313 of the Criminal Law, concerning the crime of refusing to execute judgments and rulings, provides a criminal sanction for the most egregious "Laolai" (debt defaulters) behavior. However, in practice, the initial application rate of this crime was low, and for a period of time, few cases resulted in criminal penalties. According to big data statistics, the number of cases of crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings was very small before 2016, and began to increase explosively in 2017. This shows that with the increase in the intensity of compulsory enforcement, judicial organs across the country have gradually "activated" this crime, using it as an important weapon to combat acts of refusal to execute judgments and rulings.
In order to unify law enforcement standards, the Supreme People's Court issued relevant judicial interpretations in 2015 (Interpretation No. 16 [2015] of the Supreme People's Court), clarifying the criteria for determining the crime of refusal to execute judgments and rulings. The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued new judicial interpretations in 2024 (Interpretation No. 13 [2024] of the Supreme People's Court), further detailing ten "serious" circumstances and five "particularly serious" circumstances based on the legislative interpretation of 2002, and stipulating the specific conditions for heavier punishment and lighter punishment or exemption from punishment. After clarifying the objects of punishment and the standards for sentencing, it is necessary to standardize the work coordination mechanism for handling actual cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings. In reality, the degree of importance attached to and the operational procedures for handling cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings vary among public security, procuratorial, and judicial organs in different regions. Some courts discover clues but do not transfer them in a timely manner; some public security organs are passive and do not initiate investigations into cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings transferred by the courts; and some procuratorial organs do not supervise effectively or prosecute in a timely manner, resulting in "Laolai" who should be held criminally liable not being punished, damaging judicial credibility. On the other hand, there is also the problem of demanding criminal penalties for general cases of inability to enforce, and the boundary between crime and non-crime needs to be grasped. In view of this, the Opinions further formulate procedural regulations within the framework of the aforementioned laws and judicial interpretations, aiming to improve the cooperation and coordination mechanism among the three organs in handling criminal cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings, and to achieve the lawful and strict punishment and precise crackdown on crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings. The issuance of these Opinions will help to strengthen the responsibilities of the courts, procuratorates, and public security organs in punishing crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings, improve the comprehensive governance system for enforcement difficulties, protect the rights and interests of winning parties, and promote the construction of a social credit system.
II. Article-by-Article Interpretation of the Opinions
Article 1: Principle of Division of Responsibilities and Mutual Cooperation among the Three Organs
Article Content
The people's courts, people's procuratorates, and public security organs, when handling criminal cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings, shall be responsible for their respective duties, cooperate with each other, check and balance each other, and punish crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings according to law.
Article Interpretation
This article establishes the basic principles for handling criminal cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings, namely, that the courts, procuratorates, and public security organs are responsible for their respective duties, cooperate with each other, check and balance each other, and jointly punish crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings according to law. This statement directly echoes the provisions of Article 7 of the Criminal Procedure Law: "People's courts, people's procuratorates, and public security organs, in conducting criminal proceedings, shall be responsible for their respective duties, cooperate with each other, and check and balance each other to ensure the accurate and effective enforcement of the law." This principle has constitutional and legal basis in China's criminal proceedings. For cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings, "division of responsibilities" means that the three organs have their respective duties: the courts are responsible for compulsory enforcement and judicial judgments; the public security organs are responsible for initiating investigations; and the procuratorates are responsible for legal supervision and public prosecution. "Mutual cooperation" requires the three organs to actively cooperate in handling cases, such as the courts providing timely evidence to support investigations, the public security organs quickly taking measures to control property and suspects, and the procuratorates timely intervening in supervision and guiding evidence collection, etc. "Mutual checks and balances" emphasizes supervision and checks and balances through legal procedures, such as the courts requesting the procuratorates to supervise the public security organs' initiation of investigations, and the procuratorates requiring the public security organs to explain the reasons for not initiating investigations and notifying them to initiate investigations, etc. (See Articles 7 and 8 for details). This principle ensures that the handling of cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings is both efficient and legally based, preventing buck-passing and affecting the intensity of punishment, and preventing improper intervention in the powers of other organs, leading to non-standard law enforcement. Therefore, Article 1 lays the foundation for the specific provisions in the subsequent articles, emphasizing both cooperation and checks and balances. Each organ should strictly perform its duties in accordance with this principle to ensure the accurate and timely crackdown on crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings.
Article 2: Determining the Competent Authority
Article Content
Criminal cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings are generally under the jurisdiction of the public security organs, people's procuratorates, and people's courts in the location of the executing court.
Article Interpretation
This article clarifies the principle of territorial jurisdiction for crimes of refusal to execute judgments and rulings: they are usually handled by the public security, procuratorial, and judicial organs in the location of the executing court. This means that if the enforcement work of a certain case is handled by the court in location A, then after discovering clues to a crime of refusal to execute judgments and rulings, it should be investigated by the public security organs in location A, reviewed and prosecuted by the procuratorate in location A, and tried and judged by the court in location A. This provision is conducive to connecting the enforcement procedure with the criminal procedure, because the executing court is most familiar with the case, and it is more convenient for the public security and procuratorial organs in its location to obtain enforcement evidence and cooperate in communication. This jurisdictional principle is also in line with the convention of criminal cases being primarily under the jurisdiction of the place where the crime occurred. The "place where the crime occurred" for the crime of refusal to execute judgments and rulings is often the place where the enforcement action occurred, that is, the location of the executing court, because the consequences of the act of refusing to perform the court's judgment are reflected in the place of execution. Therefore, determining the location of the executing court as the location of the competent authority is a concretization of the general principles of criminal proceedings in cases of refusal to execute judgments and rulings.
It should be noted that this article uses the wording "generally by," leaving some room for maneuver. In a few cases, if the criminal suspect (judgment debtor) has long-term residence in another place, and it is more appropriate to handle the case in his or her place of residence, it can also be handled by the public security, procuratorial, and judicial organs in his or her place of residence. This is mentioned in the relevant interpretations: "If it is more appropriate for the people's court in the place of residence of the criminal suspect or defendant to exercise jurisdiction, the public security organs, procuratorate, and court in the place of residence may exercise jurisdiction." Therefore, although the Opinions do not explicitly reiterate this exception, the word "generally" implies this flexibility. Therefore, in practice, the principle should be to exercise jurisdiction in the location of the executing court. If there are special circumstances that require a change of jurisdiction, it should be legally reported to the superior authorities for coordination and resolution to ensure that the jurisdiction is reasonable and legal.
Article 3: The Executing Court's Obligation to Transfer Clues of Refusal to Execute Judgments and Rulings
Article Content
When handling cases, if the People's Court finds that a person with an obligation to perform has allegedly committed the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment or ruling, it should prepare a case transfer letter and an explanation of the execution situation, and transfer the relevant evidence materials already obtained that prove the criminal facts to the competent public security organ for investigation.
Article Interpretation
This article stipulates the transfer responsibilities of the executing court when performing its functions of compulsory execution. When the executing court finds during execution that the person subject to execution or other obligated persons may have committed the crime of refusing to enforce, it has the obligation to promptly transfer the case leads and evidence to the public security organ for investigation. For those with the ability to perform but refuse to perform an effective judgment, and the circumstances are serious and suspected of a crime, the person subject to execution should be transferred for criminal prosecution.
Specifically, during compulsory execution, if the executing judge finds that the person subject to execution has engaged in acts such as concealing or transferring property, forging evidence to resist execution, or using violence or threats to obstruct execution, and this constitutes "having the ability to execute but refusing to execute, with serious circumstances," the matter should not be limited to civil compulsory measures (fines, detention), but the case materials should be promptly transferred to the public security organ. A previous joint notice from the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security emphasized: "In the execution process, for those who seriously refuse to execute judgments or rulings...the People's Court should transfer the case to the competent public security organ for investigation in accordance with the law." This article reiterates this requirement and further specifies the preparation of a transfer letter and an explanation of the execution situation, along with the evidence materials. This ensures that once the public security organ accepts the case, it has the basic case background and evidence, improving the efficiency of case filing and investigation. It should be noted that "discovering the alleged crime of refusing to enforce" does not require the court to have sufficient evidence to prove the crime has been committed; it only needs to meet the requirements for criminal investigation (suspicion of criminal facts). As the executing body, once the court discovers a suspected crime, it should proactively transfer the case rather than delaying or waiting, allowing the public security organ to further investigate and collect evidence. This reflects the requirements of division of responsibilities among judicial organs and prevents the delay of criminal punishment due to insufficient unilateral determination by the court.
In summary, Article 3 clarifies the executing court's responsibility for initiating the "execution to criminal prosecution" process, which is the starting point of the entire chain of punishment for the crime of refusing to enforce. The court should effectively fulfill this responsibility.
Article 4: List of evidence materials to be attached when the court transfers the case
Article Content
When transferring cases to the public security organ, the People's Court should attach the following evidence materials:
(1) Evidence materials proving the identity of the criminal suspect;
(2) Evidence materials proving that the criminal suspect has an obligation to execute or assist in execution;
(3) Evidence materials proving that the criminal suspect has the ability to execute all or part of the obligations determined by the judgment or ruling;
(4) Evidence materials proving that the criminal suspect has refused to execute the judgment or ruling;
(5) Evidence materials proving the relevant circumstances or consequences of the criminal suspect's refusal to execute the judgment or ruling.
Article Interpretation
This article lists the evidence materials that the court should provide to the public security organ when transferring cases of refusing to enforce, totaling five categories, which basically cover all the elements required to prove the crime of refusing to enforce:
Identity information evidence: Used to prove the identity information of the criminal suspect (name, ID number for natural persons, or business registration information for units). This is the basic material for case filing and investigation. Evidence of the basis for performing obligations: To prove that the suspect has an obligation determined by an effective legal document to the applicant for execution (such as an effective judgment, ruling, and execution notice). This shows that there is a statutory obligation to execute, which is a prerequisite for this crime. Evidence of the ability to perform: To prove that the suspect has the ability to perform all or part of the obligations determined by the judgment. This is one of the core elements stipulated in Article 313 of the Criminal Law, namely, "having the ability to execute but not executing." Evidence may include the property status of the person subject to execution, as well as their recent transfer of property or high-consumption records, to corroborate their ability to perform. Evidence of refusal to execute: To prove that the suspect has refused to perform. For example, the execution record of the People's Court shows that the person subject to execution refused to pay after receiving the execution notice, or resisted the delivery of property at the execution site. This type of evidence shows that subjectively, they "refused" rather than objectively being unable to perform. Evidence of serious circumstances or consequences: To prove that the suspect's refusal to execute has reached the level of "serious circumstances" or caused serious consequences. For example, a long-term inability to execute a judgment due to false reconciliation or transfer of property, or the refusal to execute causing significant losses to the applicant's personal and property rights. This is the basis for the objective seriousness requirement for the establishment of a crime.
The above materials correspond to the constituent elements of the crime of refusing to enforce: subject (identity), object (obligations determined by legal documents), subjective (having the ability but refusing to perform), objective behavior (refusal to execute), and serious consequences. By providing this evidence during the court's transfer, it helps the public security organ quickly enter the investigation stage, avoids repeated evidence collection, and improves efficiency. It should be pointed out that some of these five categories of evidence are naturally possessed by the court in the execution process, such as effective judgments, execution notices, property investigation reports, and execution records; others require the court to pay attention to collecting during the execution process, such as the investigation results of the property status of the person subject to execution and records of the person subject to execution's behavior of evading execution. If the executing court has already taken compulsory measures such as fines and detention, those documents and explanations of the situation should also be provided. In summary, this article requires the court to do a good job of "evidence transfer," which is both a legal obligation and a key step in improving the quality of handling cases of refusing to enforce in practice.
Article 5: Acceptance and case filing review period of the public security organ
Article Content
For criminal case materials transferred by the People's Court involving the alleged crime of refusing to execute judgments or rulings, the public security organ should accept them, prepare an acceptance registration form, and issue an acknowledgment.
If the public security organ finds after review that the conditions for filing a case are met, it should file a case for investigation within seven days; for cases with major and complicated circumstances, the review period can be extended to 30 days. If it is found that the conditions for filing a case are not met, a decision not to file a case should be made within the review period, and the notice of not filing a case should be served on the People's Court that transferred the case.
Article Interpretation
This article stipulates in two paragraphs the responsibilities and time limit requirements of the public security organ after receiving the case materials transferred by the court: The first paragraph requires the public security organ to unconditionally accept the materials transferred by the court involving the alleged crime of refusing to enforce, handle the case registration, and issue an acknowledgment to the court. This emphasizes the public security organ's obligation to cooperate with the court in transferring cases and prevents the phenomenon of some local public security organs refusing to accept cases. In past practice, some public security organs have refused to accept case materials transferred by the court on the grounds of "economic disputes" or "insufficient evidence," leading to the shelving of cases. In response to this, the 2007 notice clearly stated: "For cases of alleged crimes of refusing to enforce transferred by the People's Court, the public security organ should promptly file a case for investigation." This article further specifies "should accept and issue an acknowledgment" to ensure seamless connection between the transfer and acceptance stages.
Article Two stipulates a time limit for the public security organs to review and decide on case filing: generally, a decision should be made within 7 days; if the case is major, difficult, or complex, it can be extended to a maximum of 30 days with approval. This time limit is consistent with the general provisions for the public security organs to handle criminal cases. According to the relevant regulations of the Ministry of Public Security, the time limit for reviewing and deciding on criminal case filing should generally not exceed 7 days; for complex cases, it can be extended to 30 days with the approval of the person in charge of the public security organ at or above the county level. The "Opinions of the Ministry of Public Security on Reforming and Improving the System of Accepting and Filing Cases" also made similar requirements. Therefore, the time limit in the "Opinions" is consistent with the above regulations. Setting a review period of 7 days (maximum 30 days) can prevent the public security organs from delaying indefinitely. Within the time limit, the public security organs should review the evidence materials provided by the court, supplement necessary investigations, and determine whether the standard for filing a criminal case has been met.
If, after review, it is considered that the conditions for filing a case are met, the public security organs should immediately file a case for investigation, and the decision to file a case should not exceed 7 days at the latest. This reflects the requirement of "quick investigation and quick handling" of crimes of resisting enforcement; timely intervention in the investigation can prevent the suspect from transferring property, absconding, etc. At the same time, if it is considered that the conditions for filing a case are not met, the public security organs must make a decision not to file a case within the above-mentioned review period and deliver the "Notice of Not Filing a Case" to the court that transferred the case. This lays the foundation for the subsequent initiation of the procuratorial supervision procedure. It is worth noting that it is emphasized here that a case should not be filed only if "the review finds that the conditions for filing a case are not met." On the one hand, it requires the public security organs to conduct a thorough review and not to reject the case hastily; on the other hand, once a decision is made not to file a case, it must be explained in writing and notified to the court. Similar provisions were included in the early notification of the special campaign to crack down on crimes of resisting enforcement, which required the public security organs to provide written feedback to the court within 5 days if they did not file a case. This "Opinion" sets the time limit within the review period, which is stricter. In summary, Article 5 urges the public security organs to promptly accept and quickly investigate cases transferred by the court or provide feedback in accordance with the law, providing institutional guarantees for the smooth transition of resisting enforcement cases from enforcement procedures to criminal procedures.
Article Six: Investigative Measures and Property Control by the Public Security Organs
Article Content
After filing a case, the public security organs should promptly conduct investigations and take coercive measures against criminal suspects in accordance with the law.
The public security organs should promptly take measures to seize, confiscate, and freeze the assets involved in the case that the criminal suspect has disposed of through concealment or transfer, in accordance with the law.
Article Interpretation
This article regulates the standard actions that the public security organs should take after formally filing a case for investigation, emphasizing "promptly":
First, after filing a case, the public security organs should promptly conduct investigations and take coercive measures against suspects in accordance with the law. Once a case of resisting enforcement enters criminal proceedings, the public security organs have the responsibility to quickly solve the case and should promptly conduct investigations and collect evidence, including summoning or detaining suspects, questioning witnesses, and obtaining property transaction records. For those who meet the conditions for arrest, they should promptly request approval for arrest and bring the suspects under control to prevent them from absconding. Coercive measures should be taken in accordance with statutory conditions, such as Detention , release on bail pending trial, residential surveillance, or arrest. Given that resisting enforcement is usually not a violent crime, in practice, detention or release on bail pending trial are mostly used; in serious cases, where a real prison sentence may be imposed and there is a possibility of collusion or continued resistance to enforcement, arrest may be used.
Second, the public security organs should promptly investigate and control the assets involved in the case, especially those that the suspect has disposed of through concealment or transfer, and should seize, confiscate, and freeze them in accordance with the law. This provision is crucial: the purpose of cases of resisting enforcement is not only to punish the suspect but also to recover the losses of the applicant in the enforcement case. If the suspect transfers or conceals assets, the public security organs should exercise their criminal investigative powers to investigate and control them. For example, the suspect may transfer funds to the accounts of relatives, transfer real estate to others at a low price, or hide valuables; the public security organs can find clues through methods such as checking bank accounts, real estate registration, and vehicle registration, and legally freeze accounts, seize real estate, and confiscate property. This can serve as evidence of the crime and prevent the assets from being further transferred.
The judicial interpretation on several issues concerning the crime of resisting enforcement requires that the property illegally disposed of by the defendant in a crime of resisting enforcement should be recovered or ordered to be returned in accordance with the law and handled by the executing court; the procuratorate should put forward its handling opinion when filing a suit. Therefore, the timely seizure and freezing of property by the public security organs during the investigation stage, if a conviction is ultimately reached, this property can be returned through a criminal judgment or used to repay the creditor's rights of the applicant for enforcement. Conversely, if the public security organs do not promptly control the property during the criminal investigation, and the property has been transferred or squandered by the time the judgment takes effect, it will be difficult to compensate for the losses of the applicant for enforcement.
In summary, Article Six requires the public security organs to conduct investigations quickly, which is crucial for achieving the dual goals of criminal punishment and civil rights protection in resisting enforcement cases. In practice, the public security organs should closely cooperate with the court's enforcement department, make full use of the property clues and evidence provided by the court, and conduct investigations and handle cases efficiently and in accordance with the law.
Article Seven: Feedback on Non-Filing or Withdrawal of Cases by the Public Security Organs and Requests for Court Supervision
Article Content
If the public security organs do not file a case or withdraw a case after filing it, they should inform the executing court within seven days and explain the reasons. If the executing court believes that the public security organs should file a case for investigation but have not done so, it may request the People's Procuratorate to supervise it.
Article Interpretation
This article stipulates the follow-up handling and supervision mechanism when the public security organs do not file a case or withdraw a case after filing it, which has two meanings:
First, the obligation to provide information feedback: If the public security organs decide not to file a case on a case transferred by the court, or withdraw a case after filing it for investigation, they must send a letter to the executing court within 7 days, explaining the reasons for not filing or withdrawing the case. This requirement guarantees the executing court's right to know and the right to supervise cases. Through written notification, the court can understand the basis for the public security organs' decision, such as believing that the evidence is insufficient to prove "serious circumstances" or believing that it is purely a case of impossibility of performance. Without justifiable reasons, the public security organs may not ignore the transfer of the court or withdraw the case privately, otherwise, it will affect the credibility of the case handling and the rights and interests of the applicant for enforcement.
Second, the court requests procuratorial supervision: If the executing court, after receiving the letter of non-filing/withdrawal of the case from the public security organs, believes that the decision of the public security organs not to file a case is improper, the court may request the people's procuratorate at the same level to supervise it.
It should be pointed out that "requesting procuratorial supervision" does not require the court to conduct substantive review, but to submit the differences to the People's Procuratorate for review and handling according to its powers. In practice, if the public security organs do not file a case on a case transferred by the court, the applicant for enforcement will often also be dissatisfied; the court's request for supervision, to a certain extent, also represents the demands of the applicant for enforcement, guiding them to resolve their dissatisfaction through legal channels, rather than petitioning or appealing.
In summary, Article Seven establishes a supervision and interaction chain among the public security organs, the court, and the procuratorate: the public security organs must promptly inform the reasons for their decision not to file a case, and the court may request the procuratorial organs to intervene if it has any doubts. This ensures that every lead in a case of resisting enforcement has a chance to be reviewed and will not be easily "lost." This is of great significance in preventing the public security organs from being passive and inactive and ensuring that all cases that should be pursued are pursued.
Article Eight: The Procuratorate's Case-Filing Supervision Procedure
Article Content
If, after review, the People's Procuratorate finds that the public security organ should have initiated an investigation but failed to do so, it should request the public security organ to provide a written explanation of the reasons for not initiating the investigation. The public security organ shall, within seven days of receiving the notice, provide a written explanation of the circumstances, basis, and reasons for not initiating the investigation, along with relevant evidentiary materials, to the People's Procuratorate.
If, after review, the People's Procuratorate finds the reasons for not initiating the investigation by the public security organ to be untenable, it shall, upon the decision of the Procurator-General, notify the public security organ to initiate the investigation. The public security organ shall initiate the investigation within fifteen days of receiving the notice.
In reviewing and handling cases of execution supervision, if the People's Procuratorate discovers that a person with an obligation to execute is suspected of refusing to execute a judgment or ruling, it shall transfer the relevant case materials stipulated in Article 4 of this Opinion to the public security organ with jurisdiction. After receiving the criminal case materials, the public security organ shall prepare an acceptance registration form and issue an acknowledgment. If the public security organ finds that the conditions for initiating an investigation are met, it shall initiate an investigation.
Article Interpretation
This article details the steps and effectiveness of the procuratorial organs' supervision over the initiation of investigations into cases of refusal to enforce judgments, as well as the procuratorial organs' own obligation to transfer cases when they discover crimes of refusal to enforce judgments during execution supervision.
First, in cases where the court requests supervision or the procuratorial organs themselves discover that the public security organ should have initiated an investigation but failed to do so (as per Article 7), the procuratorial organs should initiate the investigation supervision procedure: first reviewing the case files. If the procurator believes that there is a need to initiate an investigation but the public security organ has not done so, the next step is to issue a "Notice Requiring Explanation of Reasons for Not Initiating Investigation" to the public security organ, requesting a written explanation of the specific reasons and basis for not initiating the investigation. According to the rules of criminal procedure, the public security organ must respond in writing within 7 days of receiving the notice from the procuratorate, attaching relevant evidentiary materials. The procuratorate will then review the public security organ's explanation and case materials. If it is deemed that the "reasons for not initiating the investigation are untenable," i.e., the reasons given by the public security organ are insufficient or do not conform to the facts, the procuratorial organs, with the approval of the Procurator-General, shall notify the public security organ to initiate the investigation. This is a direct exercise of the procuratorial supervisory power and is legally binding. Therefore, after the procuratorate notifies the initiation of the investigation, the case of refusal to enforce the judgment will enter the investigative procedure, achieving the purpose of procuratorial supervision. Through this mechanism, the procuratorial organs effectively correct potential omissions or improper failures to initiate investigations by the public security organs, ensuring that crimes of refusal to enforce judgments are prosecuted.
Second, the third paragraph of this article clarifies the obligation of the procuratorial organs to transfer leads themselves: When handling execution supervision cases, if the People's Procuratorate discovers that the person obligated to execute is suspected of a crime of refusal to enforce a judgment, it should, referring to the materials listed in Article 4 of the Opinion, transfer the case leads and evidence to the public security organ with jurisdiction, initiating criminal prosecution proceedings. In other words, the procuratorial organs also have the responsibility to transfer cases: when they discover, through the exercise of civil execution supervision, that the refusal to execute meets the standard of a crime, they should not be limited to issuing procuratorial suggestions but should switch to criminal proceedings. The public security organ, upon receiving the case materials transferred by the procuratorate, must also register the case and issue an acknowledgment, and if it deems it necessary to initiate an investigation, it shall do so. This is procedurally the same as a transfer from the court, except that the transferring entity is the procuratorial organ. If the public security organ does not initiate an investigation, the procuratorate will actually have direct control over the case and can decide whether to supervise the initiation of the investigation or conduct its own investigation.
In summary, Article 8 improves the closed-loop process of cases of refusal to enforce judgments, from the failure of the public security organ to initiate an investigation to procuratorial supervision and then to the initiation of an investigation by the public security organ, ensuring that any lead on a crime of refusal to enforce a judgment has multiple "safety valves" to prevent its loss. At the same time, it also emphasizes that the procuratorate not only supervises others but also performs its own duties by transferring leads on execution cases suspected of crimes, creating a comprehensive network for the discovery and investigation of crimes of refusal to enforce judgments.
Article 9: Responsibilities of the procuratorial organs in approving arrests and initiating prosecutions
Article Content
For arrests requested by the public security organ, the People's Procuratorate shall review and decide whether to approve the arrest within the statutory time limit; for cases transferred for review and prosecution by the public security organ, it shall conduct a timely review and, if the conditions for prosecution are met, shall initiate public prosecution in accordance with the law.
Article Interpretation
This article emphasizes the responsibilities of the procuratorial organs at various stages of the conclusion of the investigation of cases of refusal to enforce judgments, namely, the timely and lawful review of arrests and prosecutions:
Review and Approval of Arrests: For suspects in crimes of refusal to enforce judgments whose arrest is requested by the public security organ during the investigation, the procuratorial organ shall complete the review and decide whether to approve the arrest within the legally stipulated time limit. The procuratorate shall review whether the evidence meets the conditions for arrest. If the conditions are met, an arrest warrant shall be issued promptly; otherwise, a decision shall be made not to arrest or to change the coercive measures. For cases of refusal to enforce judgments, whether or not to approve an arrest may depend on factors such as whether the suspect continues to resist execution or whether there is a risk of absconding or colluding with witnesses. In summary, the procuratorial organs must strictly control arrests, both to ensure smooth litigation and to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the suspect.
Review and Initiation of Prosecution: For cases of refusal to enforce judgments that have been concluded by the public security organ and transferred to the procuratorate for review and prosecution, the procuratorial organ shall conduct a timely review. The Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that the time limit for reviewing and prosecuting is generally one month (which can be extended by half a month if necessary). The procurator shall comprehensively review the case files and evidence, verifying whether the elements of the crime are present, Investigative Actions whether they are legal, etc. If the evidence is deemed sufficient and the conditions for constituting a crime are met, public prosecution shall be promptly initiated with the court, which will then conduct the trial. If insufficient evidence is found, the case may be returned for supplementary investigation or a decision may be made not to prosecute due to doubt; if it is found that no crime has been committed at all, the case shall be dismissed in accordance with the law.
Overall, Article 9 reiterates the timeliness and regulatory requirements for the procuratorial organs to perform their duties of approving arrests and initiating prosecutions in accordance with the law. This is consistent with the requirements for handling any criminal case, but it is particularly important in cases of refusal to enforce judgments. This is because cases of refusal to enforce judgments often involve the vital interests of the applicant for execution, and prompt handling can reduce further losses caused by prolonged delays for the applicant. At the same time, strict adherence to the law by the procuratorate can ensure that only cases that truly meet the conditions for the crime of refusal to enforce judgments are brought before the court, preventing the erroneous criminalization of general execution disputes.
Article 10: Responsibilities of the court in trial and judgment
Article Content
The People's Court shall try and render judgment on cases involving the crime of refusing to execute judgments or rulings in accordance with the law.
Article Interpretation
This article emphasizes the ultimate judicial responsibility of the People's Court in cases of crimes of refusal to enforce judgments: trial in accordance with the law and timely judgment.
Article 11: Conditions for accepting self-initiated criminal prosecutions
Article Content
If the applicant for execution has evidence proving that the following circumstances exist simultaneously, and the People's Court finds that they meet the provisions of Article 210, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Procedure Law, the case shall be accepted and tried as a self-initiated prosecution:
(1) The person with the obligation to execute refuses to execute the judgment or ruling, infringing upon the applicant's personal or property rights, and should be held criminally liable in accordance with the law;
(2) The applicant for execution has previously filed a complaint, but the public security organ has refused to accept the complaint materials, has not provided a written response within 30 days of accepting the complaint materials, has decided not to initiate an investigation, or the People's Procuratorate has decided not to hold the person with the obligation to execute criminally liable.
Article Interpretation
This article provides special provisions for accepting criminal self-accusation cases, offering applicants a legal path to initiate criminal proceedings themselves when public prosecution channels are ineffective. According to Article 210, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Procedure Law: For cases where there is evidence proving a crime should be prosecuted but the public security organs or procuratorial organs do not prosecute, the victim (applicant) may file a self-accusation with the court. This article specifies this principle into two conditions, both of which must be met:
Condition 1: The respondent refuses to execute an effective judgment or ruling, and their actions infringe upon the applicant's personal or property rights, and criminal responsibility should be pursued according to law. Condition 2: The applicant has sought prosecution from the public prosecution organ but failed, or the People's Procuratorate does not pursue criminal responsibility. The two conditions must be met simultaneously, meaning that the case must fall under the category of refusal to enforce a judgment and the public security and procuratorial organs have failed to fulfill their prosecutorial duties. Only then can the court accept the case as a self-accusation and proceed with the trial. This threshold design prevents applicants from readily bypassing the public security and procuratorial organs to file a lawsuit themselves, ensuring that the self-accusation route is only a last resort. When the public security and procuratorial organs perform their duties normally, the case should be handled through public prosecution procedures.
In summary, Article 11 provides a legal basis for applicants to directly file a criminal lawsuit for the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment with the court under specific circumstances. This is a guarantee of the victim's right to self-accusation.
Article 12: Informing the applicant of the circumstances for filing a self-accusation
Article Content
If the People's Court transfers case materials for the crime of refusing to execute a judgment or ruling to the public security organ, and the public security organ decides not to file a case, or fails to provide a written response within 30 days of receiving the case materials, or the People's Procuratorate does not pursue criminal responsibility against the person with the duty to execute, the People's Court should inform the applicant that they may file a criminal self-accusation with the competent People's Court according to law.
If the People's Procuratorate transfers case materials for the crime of refusing to execute a judgment or ruling to the public security organ, and the public security organ decides not to file a case, and the People's Procuratorate finds the reasons for not filing a case by the public security organ valid, it should inform the applicant that they may file a criminal self-accusation with the competent People's Court according to law.
Article Interpretation
This article further implements the judicial organs' obligation to inform the applicant under the self-accusation conditions described in Article 11, to protect the parties' right to know and the right to sue:
First, regarding cases where the People's Court transfers the case to the public security organ but the public prosecution procedure is not initiated: If the court has transferred the materials of the case of refusal to enforce a judgment to the public security organ, but the public security organ decides not to file a case, or fails to provide a written response within 30 days of the transfer, or the People's Procuratorate ultimately does not pursue criminal responsibility against the person with the duty to execute, then the executing court should inform the applicant that they have the right to file a criminal self-accusation with the competent court according to law. The first three situations correspond to the situations where the applicant encounters inaction or non-prosecution by the public security and procuratorial organs after the court's transfer: the public security organ does not file a case, the public security organ delays indefinitely, and the procuratorate does not prosecute. As long as any of these situations occur, the public prosecution route is impassable. Therefore, the court has the responsibility to remind the applicant that they can file a lawsuit themselves.
Second, regarding cases where the People's Procuratorate transfers the case to the public security organ but the public security organ does not file a case: When the procuratorial organ transfers the case materials for the crime of refusal to enforce a judgment to the public security organ according to Article 8, Paragraph 3, if the public security organ decides not to file a case, and the procuratorial organ, after review, finds the reasons for not filing a case by the public security organ valid, then the procuratorial organ should inform the applicant that they may file a self-accusation with the competent court. This is actually the procuratorial organ's obligation to inform the applicant when its own supervisory procedure is concluded. If the procurator also agrees that the case should not be publicly prosecuted, then the procuratorial system's route is also impassable, but the applicant still has the right to choose whether to further pursue the matter through self-accusation. Therefore, the procuratorate should clearly inform the applicant of this information, allowing them to make their own decision.
Article 13: Requirements for materials in self-accusation cases
Article Content
When an applicant files a criminal self-accusation with the People's Court against a person with a duty to execute for the crime of refusing to execute a judgment or ruling, the following materials should be submitted:
(1) Criminal self-accusation statement;
(2) Materials proving the identity of the self-accuser. If the self-accuser's legal representative or close relative reports or reports on their behalf, materials proving the relationship with the self-accuser and materials proving that the self-accuser cannot report in person should be provided;
(3) Materials proving the effective legal document, the acceptance notice of the execution case, etc., as the basis for execution;
(4) Evidence materials proving that the criminal suspect has a duty to execute or assist in execution, has the ability to execute but refuses to execute;
(5) Materials proving that the public security organ did not accept the accusation materials or failed to provide a written response within 30 days, or the non-case filing notice issued by the public security organ, or the non-prosecution decision issued by the People's Procuratorate;
(6) Other materials that the People's Court deems necessary.
Article Interpretation
This article lists the materials that must be submitted when an applicant files a self-accusation case for the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment, totaling six items, basically covering all aspects of materials needed to prove the establishment of a self-accusation case:
Criminal self-accusation statement: That is, the indictment stating the identity information of the defendant (the person with the duty to execute), the cause of action, the facts and evidence, and the litigation request. This is an essential legal document for initiating self-accusation procedures, equivalent to the indictment in public prosecution cases, written by the self-accuser or their agent. According to the Criminal Procedure Law and relevant judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court, the self-accusation statement should state the name and identity of the defendant, the course of the case, and the litigation request.
Self-accuser identity materials: Used to prove the subject qualification of the applicant filing the lawsuit. Natural persons should submit identity proof. If the lawsuit is filed by a legal representative or close relative, proof of the relationship between the agent and the principal and proof that the principal cannot file the lawsuit themselves must be provided. This requirement ensures that the plaintiff has the appropriate status, that is, the party whose rights have been truly harmed or their legal heir/agent.
Proof of execution basis and case acceptance: Including effective legal documents (judgments, rulings, mediation documents, etc.) and the acceptance notice of the execution case. These materials prove the existence of legally effective execution basis and that the execution procedure has been initiated. The effective document proves the specific content of the execution obligation, and the execution acceptance notice proves that the applicant has legally applied for compulsory execution, indicating that the obligation involved in the criminal case has entered the execution stage but has not been fulfilled.
Evidence of having an obligation, having the ability but refusing to execute: This is similar to the evidence provided by the court during the transfer in Article 4, except that it is now provided by the applicant. This part should at least include: evidence that the respondent has an obligation, evidence of their ability to perform (property clues, proof of income and financial resources, etc.), and evidence of their refusal to perform (such as records of evasion or resistance during execution). This evidence is used to preliminarily prove that the defendant's actions constitute the elements of the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment, which is the core basis for the court to accept the self-accusation case.
Proof that the public security and procuratorial organs have not pursued accountability: This includes one of the following materials: relevant proof that the public security organ did not accept the accusation; or proof that there was no written reply within 30 days after the public security organ accepted the case (such as proof of the applicant sending the accusation materials to the public security organ and an explanation of the situation where there was still no notification after 30 days); or a non-prosecution notice from the public security organ; or a non-prosecution decision from the procuratorate. This item corresponds to the situations required in the second paragraph of Article 11, proving that the public prosecution organ has not or cannot pursue accountability, thus meeting the conditions for a private prosecution.
Other materials required by the court: A catch-all clause. If the court deems it necessary to supplement materials during its review, for example: if the defendant is an entity, it is also necessary to provide business registration information, organization code, etc., to prove its subject qualification; or if it is necessary to prove that the applicant has reported to the public security, it may require providing a reporting receipt or police report, etc.
In practice, it may be difficult for the applicant to collect the above materials on their own, especially the evidence proving the ability to perform but refusal to perform (item 4) and the proof concerning the handling of the case by the public security/procuratorate (item 5). Therefore, Articles 15 and 16 stipulate the obligation of the court and the public security to assist the private prosecutor in collecting evidence (such as copying evidence and investigating the whereabouts of the defendant). Through these supporting measures, the burden of proof on the applicant can be reduced, and the possibility of successful filing of private prosecution cases can be increased.
In summary, Article 13 lists a clear list of materials for applicants to file private prosecution cases for the crime of refusing to enforce. This guides applicants in preparing for litigation and facilitates the court's inspection based on the list, improving the standardization and transparency of filing work. Once the materials are complete, the court's filing division should promptly file the case, ensuring that the applicant's right to sue is implemented.
Article 14: Filing of Private Prosecution Cases and Property Preservation Measures
Article Content
After reviewing the materials submitted by the applicant, the people's court's filing department shall promptly file private prosecution cases that meet the filing conditions.
The people's court shall promptly take measures such as seizure, seizure, and freezing of the property involved in the case that has been handled by the criminal suspect through means such as concealment and transfer.
Article Interpretation
This article contains two meanings: one is the requirement for court filing review and filing speed, and the other is the court's property preservation measures in private prosecution cases.
First, filing review and prompt filing: For the criminal private prosecution materials submitted by the applicant, the court's filing department shall conduct a formal review to verify whether the conditions stipulated in Article 11 are met and whether the materials listed in Article 13 are complete. If it is confirmed that the conditions for private prosecution are met, the case should be filed promptly without delay or shirking. Second, control of property involved in the case: This paragraph stipulates that during the filing or trial of private prosecution cases, the court shall promptly take measures such as seizure, seizure, and freezing of the property involved in the case that has been handled by the defendant through means such as concealment and transfer. That is to say, even if the criminal private prosecution procedure is entered, and there is no investigation by the public security organ, the court is also responsible for preserving and controlling the property. This echoes the provision in Article 6 requiring the control of property during the public security investigation stage, both aiming to prevent the loss of property involved in the case and guarantee the execution of future judgments.
In public prosecution cases, the seizure, seizure, and freezing of property are usually carried out by the public security investigative organs; however, in private prosecution cases, since there is no prior public security investigation, the court should take the initiative. This is similar to the property preservation measures in civil litigation, but here it is in the context of criminal proceedings. The court can, based on the property clues provided by the applicant or the property information obtained during the execution procedure, preserve the property under the name of the defendant.
In terms of legal principles, there is a basis for the court to control property during the criminal private prosecution stage: On the one hand, the Criminal Procedure Law does not prohibit the court from taking necessary preservation measures during the trial stage, especially in the case of private prosecution, the court also undertakes some functions similar to investigation. On the other hand, according to the 2024 judicial interpretation and the Criminal Law, the crime of refusing to enforce not only involves individuals but also illegally disposed property. The court's advance control of property is conducive to handling it together at the time of judgment, and immediate execution after judgment, avoiding empty judgments.
In practice, once the court accepts a private prosecution case, it should promptly inquire about the property clues of the defendant held by the applicant, and may request the original executing court or local real estate registration and banking institutions to assist in the investigation, and then quickly rule on preservation. Many judgment debtors, once aware that they will be held criminally liable, may take risks to transfer their remaining property or even flee. Therefore, this article emphasizes the "prompt" seizure, seizure, and freezing, which should be required to proceed simultaneously with the filing under the conditions. This is also a protection of the rights of the private prosecutor, so that their hope of winning the case will not be lost due to the loss of property.
In summary, Article 14 establishes the responsibility system of the court after taking over private prosecution cases: no delay in filing, and no neglect of property. This makes up for the lack of investigative power in criminal private prosecution procedures, with the court actively undertaking some control functions.
Article 15: Provision and Copying of Evidence in Private Prosecutions
Article Content
During the filing or trial of a private prosecution case, if the private prosecutor requests copies of evidence already collected and fixed by the executing court that proves that their personal or property rights have been violated, the executing court shall provide them promptly.
Article Interpretation
The purpose of this article is to solve the problem of difficulty in collecting evidence in criminal private prosecution cases, stipulating the assisting obligation of the executing court in providing evidence materials to the private prosecutor.
Specifically: When a private prosecution case for the crime of refusing to enforce has been filed or is being tried, if the private prosecutor requests the court responsible for executing the case to obtain copies of the evidence collected and fixed by the executing court during the execution procedure, and this evidence can be used to prove that the private prosecutor's personal or property rights have been violated, then the executing court shall promptly provide the private prosecutor with copies or duplicates of these evidence materials.
This provision fully considers the status of the applicant in criminal private prosecutions. Since there is no investigative organ to assist in collecting evidence in private prosecution cases, the private prosecutor needs to collect evidence on their own. However, the executing court often has obtained some key evidence in the previous execution process, such as: the defendant's property declaration, property investigation report, execution record, and service documents. These materials are very important for proving the crime of refusing to enforce. Without the assistance of the executing court, it would be difficult for the private prosecutor to obtain these materials. Therefore, this article grants the private prosecutor the right to request copies of evidence and the executing court the obligation to cooperate. Once the private prosecutor makes a request, the executing court should provide it promptly and should not shirk on the grounds of confidentiality. After all, this evidence involves the rights and interests of the private prosecutor and should be open to them.
In summary, through this provision, the problem of difficulty in collecting evidence for private prosecutors can be greatly alleviated. They do not need to repeatedly request certificates from industrial and commercial bureaus and banks; they only need to borrow them from the executing court. This also reflects the internal cooperation of judicial organs: although the executing court is not the trial court for private prosecution cases, it should provide support to the trial court and the private prosecutor to jointly complete the investigation and punishment of the crime of refusing to enforce.
Article 16: Assistance in Investigation When the Defendant's Whereabouts Are Unknown
Article Content
If the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown, the people's court may request the public security organ to assist in the search, and the public security organ shall assist in accordance with the law.
Article Interpretation
This article stipulates that in criminal private prosecution cases, if the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown, the court may request the public security organ to assist in finding the defendant, and the public security organ has the obligation to cooperate in the investigation.
Defendants in cases involving the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment are often the persons against whom enforcement is sought. Some "deadbeats" may evade enforcement by hiding for extended periods or remaining untraceable. In such cases, if the applicant for enforcement files a private criminal prosecution but cannot locate the defendant, it will severely impact the proceedings: the court cannot properly serve copies of the indictment or summons, the case cannot be heard, and may not even be filed.
Article 16 provides a mechanism to address this issue. Although it is a private prosecution, the court can utilize the resources of the public security organs to assist in locating the defendant. Public security organs have advantages such as access to population information, household registration systems, and technical investigative methods; assisting in the investigation of missing or hidden persons is part of their statutory duties. "Legal assistance" means that upon receiving a request from the court, the public security organs should use methods such as household registration checks, online monitoring, and information comparison to locate the defendant.
In summary, Article 16 provides support for personnel control in private prosecutions for the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment, avoiding the awkward situation where the defendant flees and the prosecution becomes meaningless. The cooperation between the public security organs and the courts plays a role in ensuring the smooth progress of the case.
Article 17: Reconciliation and Withdrawal of Private Prosecutions
Article Content
Before the judgment is pronounced, the private prosecutor may reconcile with the defendant or withdraw the private prosecution.
Article Interpretation
This article grants the private prosecutor the right to reconcile or withdraw the prosecution before judgment. This is a special provision for private criminal prosecutions compared to public prosecutions, in line with legal provisions and practical needs.
The value of this provision lies in encouraging reconciliation and promoting fulfillment. The special nature of the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment lies in the fact that the ultimate purpose of its criminal deterrence is to promote the fulfillment of effective judgments. When the threat of criminal prosecution hangs over their heads, most persons against whom enforcement is sought will weigh the pros and cons and choose to fulfill their obligations in order to obtain the applicant's forgiveness and avoid criminal liability. This achieves both the winning of the lawsuit and the saving of judicial resources. Of course, there are also extreme situations: if the defendant and the private prosecutor collude to evade the law through withdrawal of the prosecution, for example, the person against whom enforcement is sought makes a partial payment to induce the applicant to withdraw the prosecution, but still does not fulfill the obligation in full afterwards. In this case, the applicant for enforcement can re-report or file a private prosecution, but the difficulty increases. Therefore, the court should inquire about the content of the reconciliation when reviewing the withdrawal of the prosecution, and try to ensure that it is fulfilled once and for all or has a practical guarantee, to avoid leaving hidden dangers.
In summary, Article 17 provides a flexible exit for private prosecutions for the crime of refusing to enforce a judgment, similar to the system of criminal reconciliation. It respects the wishes of the parties while achieving the purpose of settling disputes.
Article 18: Handling of Obstruction of Enforcement by State Organ Personnel
Article Content
If, during enforcement, the people's court discovers that a state organ worker is suspected of using their power to obstruct enforcement, it should promptly transfer the clues of disciplinary violations to the relevant disciplinary inspection and supervision organs or the people's procuratorate for handling in accordance with the law.
Article Interpretation
This article focuses on another serious situation of obstructing enforcement: state organ personnel using their power to interfere with or obstruct court enforcement. In such cases, the people's court should promptly transfer the relevant clues of disciplinary violations to the disciplinary inspection and supervision organs or the procuratorate for handling.
In actual enforcement work, there are indeed individual state organ workers who use their power to tip off the person against whom enforcement is sought, protect their property, issue false certificates, or even resist court enforcement. For example, some local grassroots cadres help "deadbeats" hide their property, or local public officials abuse their power to obstruct enforcement. Such acts undermine judicial authority and are serious in nature.
This provision reflects another important aspect of the problem of difficulty in enforcement: eliminating "protective umbrellas." Difficulty in enforcement is sometimes not only due to the recalcitrance of the person against whom enforcement is sought, but may also be due to the support of "dark forces." In summary, Article 18 improves the mechanism for handling related illegal and criminal acts of obstructing enforcement. By linking anti-corruption efforts with the criminal law regulations in the preceding clauses, a comprehensive network of deterrence and punishment for refusal to enforce is formed, further ensuring the seriousness of court judgments and rulings.
Article 19: Establishing a Three-Level Joint Meeting Mechanism
Article Content
The people's courts, the people's procuratorates, and the public security organs should establish a joint meeting mechanism, designate specific personnel, strengthen communication and exchange, strengthen supervision and checks and balances, and ensure the implementation of this opinion.
Article Interpretation
This article focuses on the construction of a long-term working mechanism for handling cases of refusal to enforce judgments, requiring the three organs of public security, procuratorate, and court to establish a regular consultation and liaison meeting system, and to assign specific personnel to be responsible for daily communication and coordination, in order to strengthen cooperation and supervision, ensure that the various provisions of the "Opinion" are truly implemented, improve the quality and efficiency of handling cases of refusal to enforce judgments, and provide support for the transition from a basic solution to the difficulty of enforcement to a long-term mechanism.
Article 20: Effective Date of the Opinion
Article Content
This opinion shall come into effect on July 1, 2025.
Article Interpretation
The "Opinion" will be officially implemented on July 1, 2025. The content of the "Opinion" is mainly a refinement of legal principles and should be strictly followed. Once a case of refusal to enforce a judgment is encountered, each organ should handle it according to the procedures in the "Opinion," truly achieving closed-loop management of "every case must be transferred, every transferred case must be filed, every filed case must be investigated, every investigation must lead to prosecution, and every prosecution must lead to a judgment."
IV. Analysis of Practical Issues and Cooperation Mechanisms
The implementation of the "Opinion" will raise the handling of cases of crimes of refusal to enforce judgments to a new level. In order to fully exert its effectiveness, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the challenges that the courts, procuratorates, and public security organs may encounter in practice, and to explore corresponding solutions. At the same time, the respective responsibilities and cooperation methods of the three organs in cases of refusal to enforce judgments should be clearly defined. The following analyzes the division of responsibilities and cooperation mechanisms of the three organs and the practical difficulties, based on the actual situation.
(I) Overview of the Division of Responsibilities and Cooperation among the Three Organs
According to the "Opinion" and current legal provisions, the general process and division of labor for handling cases of crimes of refusal to enforce judgments are as follows:
People's Courts: As the main body of enforcement, the court is responsible for transferring cases (Article 3) and providing relevant evidence (Article 4) after discovering clues of crimes of refusal to enforce judgments. The enforcement court must also inform the applicant of their right to file a private prosecution if the police investigation or procuratorial supervision is unsuccessful (Article 12). If the case enters the private prosecution procedure, the court's filing department is responsible for reviewing and accepting the case (Article 14). During the trial, the enforcement court must assist in providing evidence (Article 15). Finally, the criminal trial court tries and judges the case in accordance with the law (Article 10). In addition, the court should transfer clues involving public officials obstructing enforcement to the disciplinary inspection and supervision organs or the procuratorate (Article 18). Overall, the court's responsibilities run throughout the entire process: it is both the initiator of the procedure for crimes of refusal to enforce judgments and the final judge, and bears the obligation to support private prosecutions and transfer supervision.
Public Security Organs: The main responsibility of the Public Security organs is investigation. Upon receiving materials transferred by the court, they must promptly accept and decide whether to file a case (Article 5). After filing a case, the Public Security organs are responsible for controlling suspects, conducting investigations and collecting evidence, including asset inquiries, interrogations, and searches (Article 6). The Public Security organs should also provide feedback on their decisions: for cases not filed or withdrawn, they must inform the court of the reasons within 7 days (Article 7). In cases of self-accusation where the defendant cannot be found, the Public Security organs have the responsibility to assist in the search (Article 16). In addition, under the joint mechanism, the Public Security organs need to cooperate with the court and procuratorate in holding meetings and exchanging information (Article 19). Therefore, the role of the Public Security organs is concentrated in the middle stage of the case: it acts as a bridge, transforming the clues transferred by the court into a complete chain of evidence, which is then handed over to the procuratorate or court for processing. The Public Security organs need to maintain close communication with the court and procuratorate: on the one hand, respecting court transfers and handling cases seriously, and on the other hand, accepting procuratorial supervision, ensuring that cases that should be filed are filed and that investigations are conducted when necessary.
People's Procuratorate: The procuratorial organs play a supervisory and coordinating role in cases of resisting enforcement. On the one hand, the procuratorate exercises supervision over the filing of cases by the Public Security organs, and can request explanations and notify the filing of cases (Article 8). On the other hand, the procuratorate is responsible for reviewing arrests and prosecutions (Article 9). If the Public Security organs transfer a case for review and prosecution after investigation, the procurator decides whether to initiate public prosecution, advancing the case to trial. The procuratorate also bears the obligation to inform of self-accusation: when the Public Security organs do not file a case transferred by the procuratorate and the reasons are valid, the applicant should be reminded that they can file a self-accusation (Article 12, paragraph 2). In addition, if the procuratorate discovers crimes of resisting enforcement during execution supervision, it can also proactively transfer the case to the Public Security organs for investigation (Article 8, paragraph 3). Therefore, the procuratorate connects the Public Security organs and the court: it can supervise the filing of cases by the Public Security organs, and it is responsible for reviewing prosecutions and appearing in court to support public prosecutions; and in some cases, it directly submits clues to the Public Security organs. The procuratorial organs must both strengthen legal supervision and maintain positive interaction and communication with the court and Public Security organs, preventing buck-passing and shirking of responsibility.
The three organs perform their respective duties according to the above division of labor, while also being interconnected at multiple nodes through constraint and cooperation mechanisms: such as court transfer—Public Security acceptance, Public Security feedback—court request for supervision, procuratorate notification of case filing—Public Security execution of case filing, court notification of self-accusation—applicant prosecution—Public Security cooperation in investigation, court trial, etc. Through the orderly connection of these links, the handling of resisting enforcement cases forms a closed loop.
(II) Practical Difficulties and Suggestions
Although the Opinions clearly stipulate the procedures and responsibilities, some difficulties may still be encountered in practice. The following lists the main problems and proposes corresponding suggestions:
1. Evidence Identification Standards and Transfer Thresholds: Enforcement judges sometimes are unsure about what constitutes "suspicion of resisting enforcement," leading to untimely or non-transfer of cases. Some judges may hesitate to transfer cases due to insufficient evidence or fear that the Public Security organs will not file a case. Suggestion: Unify evidence identification standards and strengthen training. The Supreme People's Court has previously clarified 10 situations of "serious circumstances" and evidence requirements in its judicial interpretations. Enforcement judges should be guided to judge according to the criminal case filing standard of "evidence proving criminal suspicion," and transfer the case once the standard is met.
2. Public Security Case Filing Activeness and Investigative Capacity: In the past, the lack of motivation of Public Security organs in handling resisting enforcement cases was prominent. Some economic crime investigation departments considered these cases to be "civil disputes," and did not invest enough effort, and even had a sense of fear. Even if a case is filed and investigated, due to the involvement of asset investigation and execution expertise, there may be a lack of experience. Suggestion: Strengthen assessment and supervision. All levels of Public Security organs should include the handling of resisting enforcement crimes in performance assessments, and hold accountable those responsible for not filing cases or delaying investigations without justifiable reasons. In addition, special teams can be established within the economic investigation detachment or public security department to handle resisting enforcement and related crimes involving execution, improving professionalism. Through these measures, the initiative and ability of the Public Security organs in handling resisting enforcement cases can be improved, enabling them to effectively fulfill the requirements of Articles 5 and 6, and to investigate and solve cases efficiently within the time limit.
3. Procuratorial Supervision Strength and Coordination Efficiency: The procuratorial organs have the responsibility of case filing supervision, but in reality, the procuratorial organs may face a large number of cases and a shortage of personnel, resulting in insufficient and untimely supervision of the Public Security organs' failure to file cases, and even some concerns. At the same time, there may be inconsistencies within the procuratorate regarding whether the resisting enforcement case is "serious," affecting the supervision decision. Suggestion: On the one hand, the procuratorial organs should raise their political standing and regard the supervision of case filing for resisting enforcement crimes as an important task in upholding judicial authority, ensuring that all cases are supervised. A special ledger can be established to record each case requested for supervision by the court, tracking the entire process from case acceptance to notification of case filing to ensure that no cases are missed or delayed. On the other hand, strengthen communication with the Public Security organs and the court, and unify understanding of the standards for resisting enforcement crimes and the necessity of supervision at joint meetings.
4. Difficulties in the Application of Criminal Self-Accusation and Remedies: Although the criminal self-accusation system empowers applicants for enforcement, they face some difficulties in practice: such as difficulties in providing evidence (not knowing how to prove the inaction of the Public Security organs, incomplete materials listed in Article 13 will be rejected), high costs, and lack of ability. These may lead to the self-accusation mechanism being "good on paper but difficult to implement in practice." Suggestion: Judicial organs should fulfill the requirements of Article 12 and provide explanations and guidance. While informing applicants of their right to self-accusation, a concise self-accusation guide can be attached, listing the required materials (similar to the content of Article 13).
5. Balancing Execution and Criminal Linkage: The intervention of criminal means in execution is intended to combat stubborn "deadbeats," but in practice, there is also the issue of how to balance execution procedures and criminal procedures. On the one hand, if criminal cases are filed too early, it may lead to rigid confrontation, which is not conducive to the compelled party raising funds to perform; on the other hand, if criminal proceedings are not initiated while waiting for the compelled party to perform, the deterrent effect is lost. The three organs of Public Security, procuratorate, and court sometimes find it difficult to grasp the best time to intervene. Another balance is that once a criminal judgment becomes effective and the compelled party is imprisoned, the civil claim may still be unresolved. Suggestion: Develop guidelines for assessing imprisonment, allowing the enforcement court to comprehensively assess the compelled party's willingness to perform, performance history, and asset clues when considering transfer. For those who are clearly maliciously refusing to perform and have no hope of reconciliation, resolutely transfer the case; for those who have shown some repayment performance, appropriate leniency can be given, but a clear deadline should be set, and if they still do not perform after the deadline, the case should be immediately transferred without repeated delays. During the review of prosecution and court trial, the procuratorate should also implement the principle of leniency and severity: for those with minor criminal circumstances and who have partially performed, they can be not prosecuted or exempted from punishment according to judicial interpretations; for those with serious subjective malice and obvious resistance, resolutely pursue strict prosecution and sentencing to create a deterrent effect. For example, those who refuse to pay child support or alimony, leading to family hardship, should be punished severely according to the law. In addition, after the criminal judgment becomes effective, the enforcement court should promptly follow up, using the facts determined in the judgment and the clauses for confiscation and compensation to continue tracking asset clues, and quickly realize the applicant's claims during or after the execution of the punishment. For those with no income due to imprisonment, the procedures for selling property and offsetting debts in the execution process can be initiated according to the law, minimizing the applicant's losses. In summary, it is necessary to ensure that "deadbeats" do not exploit loopholes, while avoiding harming honest debtors, achieving both deterrence and education.
V. Conclusion
The release of the "Opinions" marks a new stage in China's efforts to address the "difficulty in enforcement" problem. By analyzing the "Opinions" clause by clause, we can clearly see that it systematically regulates the responsibilities and cooperation of the courts, procuratorates, and public security organs at various stages, including case filing and investigation, review and prosecution, criminal trial, and self-accusation remedies, thus constructing a complete chain for punishing crimes of resisting enforcement.
For judicial practice, the implementation of the "Opinions" will bring a series of positive changes: courts will no longer be helpless against the behavior of debtors, providing strong backing for transferring cases to criminal and self-accusation channels; procuratorial organs will fully play their dual roles of "legal supervision" and "public interest representation"; and public security organs will also combat resistance to enforcement through cooperation. Of course, the implementation of the "Opinions" will take time. During this process, various organs should pay attention to experience accumulation and feedback on problems, and promptly improve details.
It is evident that the release of the "Opinions" has significant institutional value and practical significance: it injects a strong "prescription" into the current predicament of "difficulty in enforcement," using the authority of criminal law to guarantee the realization of civil rights and using inter-departmental cooperation mechanisms to break through the bottleneck of single-handed efforts. In the near future, under the guidance of the "Opinions," the problem of difficulty in enforcement will gradually ease and even be resolved, and the legitimate rights and interests of the parties will be more effectively protected.
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